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THE LOST HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE
TARA LEIGH GROVE*
This Article challenges the conventional narrative about the political question doctrine. Scholars commonly assert that the doctrine, which instructs that certain constitutional questions are “committed” to Congress or to the executive branch, has
been part of our constitutional system since the early nineteenth century.
Furthermore, scholars argue that the doctrine is at odds with the current Supreme
Court’s view of itself as the “supreme expositor” of all constitutional questions.
This Article calls into question both claims. The Article demonstrates, first, that the
current political question doctrine does not have the historical pedigree that
scholars attribute to it. In the nineteenth century, “political questions” were not
constitutional questions but instead were factual determinations made by the political branches that courts treated as conclusive in the course of deciding cases.
Second, when the current doctrine was finally created in the mid-twentieth century,
the Supreme Court used it to entrench, rather than to undermine, the Court’s
emerging supremacy over constitutional law. Under the current doctrine, the Court
asserts for itself the power to decide which institution decides any constitutional
question. With control over that first-order question, the Court can conclude not
only that an issue is textually committed to a political branch but also that an issue
is committed to the Court itself. This analysis turns on its head the assumption of
scholars that the current doctrine is at odds with judicial supremacy. The modern
political question doctrine is a species of—not a limitation on—judicial supremacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The political question doctrine has long puzzled scholars of federal courts and constitutional law. Unlike other aspects of Article III
jurisdiction (like standing, ripeness, and mootness), which define the
circumstances under which the federal courts may decide legal issues,
the political question doctrine instructs that the courts may not decide
certain issues—most prominently, federal constitutional claims—at
all.1 Thus, even if a federal court is convinced that the legislative or
executive branch violated the Constitution, the court lacks jurisdiction
to issue such a declaration, because that constitutional question is
“committed” to another branch.2
1 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (stating that a
court “lacks the authority to decide [a] dispute” involving a political question);
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (expressing that standing,
mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine “all originate in Article III’s ‘case’
or ‘controversy’ language”).
2 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993). A “political question” is thus
analytically distinct from a situation where the court concludes that the political branches
acted within the scope of their constitutional power. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
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Scholars have strongly disputed the nature, scope, and wisdom of
this doctrine,3 but they do seem to share two basic assumptions. First,
the doctrine has been a feature of our legal system for over two hundred years.4 Since Marbury v. Madison, scholars assert, the federal
courts have treated some constitutional questions as outside the scope
of judicial review.5 Second, and relatedly, scholars claim that this
longstanding doctrine has recently been on the decline.6 During the
past few decades, the Supreme Court has asserted itself as the
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1224–26 & n.40 (1978) (“[A]ny invocation of the political question doctrine” presumes that
“there is a constitutional norm which is applicable to the controversy at hand, but which
cannot or should not be enforced by the federal judiciary.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Political
Questions and Political Remedies, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 243, 245 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E.
Cain eds., 2007) (“The essence of the doctrine is that it may bar judicial enforcement of
actual legal constraints on government behavior.”).
3 Scholars have variously defended the doctrine, see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme
than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 335 (2002) (arguing that the political question doctrine is
important in part because it prevents the Supreme Court from “being left alone to police
the boundaries of its power”); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question
Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 101 (1988) (asserting that a better explanation of the
doctrine, rather than its wholesale rejection, is necessary), sought the abolition of the
doctrine, see Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The
Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127 (1994) (arguing that the
doctrine should be abandoned “at this point as a thorn in the side of separated powers,
properly understood”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1985) (arguing for the repudiation of the doctrine); Louise
Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 889
(1994) (arguing that interpretation of constitutional law cannot be confided to a political
branch exclusively), or even argued that there is no such doctrine, see Louis Henkin, Is
There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600–01 (1976) (arguing that
many so-called “political question” cases simply uphold government action on the merits).
4 Scholars often assert that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), laid the
foundation for the political question doctrine. See Barkow, supra note 3, at 239 (tracing the
doctrine to Marbury); Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the
Political Question Doctrine, the Standing Doctrine, and the Doctrine of Equitable
Discretion, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 523, 523–24, 527 (2008) (“The political question doctrine
. . . is of longstanding stature in American jurisprudence, dating back to Chief Justice John
Marshall’s Marbury v. Madison decision in 1803.”); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering
the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions, Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1899, 1909 (2006) (“[T]he political question doctrine dates back to the
Supreme Court’s handling of William Marbury’s lawsuit.”); John C. Yoo, The Continuation
of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
167, 194 (1996) (similarly asserting that the doctrine dates back to Marbury); see also Aziz
Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20 (2013) (stating the
doctrine was “[i]ntimated first by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison”).
Alternatively, some scholars trace the doctrine to Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849). E.g., Redish, supra note 3, at 1036; see also sources cited infra note 85.
5 See sources cited supra note 4.
6 Barkow, supra note 3, at 240; Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A
Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 649–50 (1989).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-6\NYU602.txt

unknown

Seq: 4

2-DEC-15

11:58

December 2015] LOST HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 1911

“supreme” expositor of constitutional law (whose constitutional views
are binding on all other federal and state officials) and has therefore
been wary of a doctrine limiting the scope of judicial review. 7 Rachel
Barkow nicely captured the prevailing sentiment, when she argued
that “[t]he political question doctrine . . . cannot coexist”8 with the
current Court’s conception of itself as “ ‘the ultimate expositor of the
constitutional text.’” 9
I seek to challenge this conventional narrative. I argue that the
current political question doctrine does not have the historical pedigree that scholars attribute to it. In fact, the current doctrine was not
created until the mid-twentieth century, when it was employed by the
Supreme Court to entrench, rather than to undermine, its emerging
supremacy over constitutional law.
Although courts in the nineteenth century did apply a “political
question doctrine,” the doctrine that existed at that time was strikingly
different from the current version. Under this early doctrine (which I
refer to as the “traditional political question doctrine”), political questions were factual determinations made by the political branches that
courts treated as conclusive in the course of resolving cases. Thus,
courts did not dismiss as nonjusticiable an issue that presented a political question but rather enforced and applied the political branches’
conclusion. In other words, the courts treated the political branches’
determination as a (factual) rule of decision for the case. That was
true, even if the courts believed that the political branches were in
error. The Supreme Court, for example, treated as conclusive the
executive’s determination that a given country controlled a foreign
territory, “whether the executive be right or wrong.”10 This traditional
doctrine, moreover, was not a matter of Article III jurisdiction. Both
federal and state courts were required to enforce and apply the determinations of the federal political branches on “political questions.”11
7 See Barkow, supra note 3, at 240 (“[T]he demise of the political question doctrine is
of recent vintage, and it correlates with the ascendancy of a novel theory of judicial
supremacy.”); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested
Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1459 (2005) (arguing the doctrine is “in serious decline, if not
fully expired” because it is “clearly at odds with the [Court’s] notion of judicial
supremacy”).
8 Barkow, supra note 3, at 300.
9 Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000)).
10 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
11 No scholar seems to have recognized that this traditional doctrine was the heart of
the early political question doctrine. Indeed, only a few modern scholars seem to have
noticed this strand of the doctrine. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political
Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 592–93 (2007) (discussing cases that show “an
important branch of [the political question] doctrine operated to identify factual questions
on which courts would accept the political branches’ determinations as binding”); see also
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Aside from dicta in one case,12 however, there is little evidence
that this judicial subservience extended to constitutional claims. That
is, the courts did not treat the political branches’ constitutional judgments as “rules of decision” for a case. Nor did courts dismiss constitutional claims as nonjusticiable. Instead, courts regularly adjudicated
constitutional questions on the merits, including those that are today
considered “political questions,” such as the validity of constitutional
amendments and (through 1911) the Guarantee Clause.13
The Supreme Court continued to apply the traditional doctrine
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. And although the
Court held for the first time in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Oregon that a Guarantee Clause claim was a nonjusticiable
political question,14 the Court did not thereby create a new political
question doctrine extending beyond the Guarantee Clause. In fact,
only a plurality of the Court suggested in two cases that other constitutional claims might be nonjusticiable. 15 Accordingly, through the
mid-twentieth century, the only political question doctrine that had
been adopted by the Court as a whole was the traditional doctrine.
Somewhat remarkably, however, and despite the lack of change
in the case law, much of the legal community gradually came to see
the “political question doctrine” as a device that would prohibit federal courts from ruling on certain constitutional issues. Although there
may be multiple explanations for this shift, I suggest that one important influence was the academic discourse about the doctrine. From
the 1930s through the 1950s, in both casebooks and articles, legal
scholars increasingly ignored the traditional doctrine and instead
focused on Pacific States and the plurality decisions, arguing that the
“political question doctrine” was an Article III device defining the
scope of judicial review.16 It is surprising that academics, and particularly casebook authors, would highlight a doctrine that had not been
adopted by the Supreme Court. But this phenomenon was likely tied
John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of Article III
Adjudication, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1367, 1372–74 (2007) (recognizing that the Court accepted
some determinations by the political branches as “binding,” although describing the
political branches’ findings as determinations of “legal questions”); infra notes 32–34 and
accompanying text (noting other scholarship that has mentioned some early cases).
12 In Luther, the Court suggested in dicta that the judiciary was required to enforce
Congress’s determination of Guarantee Clause issues. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). I
discuss Luther at length below. See infra Part I.B.
13 See infra Part I.C.
14 223 U.S. 118, 133 (1912); see also infra Part II.A (discussing Pac. States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)).
15 See infra Part II.B (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), and Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)).
16 See infra Part III.
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to a jurisprudential movement known as “legal process theory.” In the
post-Lochner era, legal scholars were engaged in a profound debate
over the legitimacy of judicial review. Legal process scholars argued
that judicial review could be both constrained and legitimated through
procedure; jurisdictional rules, like standing and ripeness, would
determine when judges were authorized to make constitutional pronouncements.17 A “political question doctrine” that emanated from
Article III and prevented federal courts from ruling on certain constitutional questions fit nicely into this legal process vision. Accordingly,
legal process theorists had good reason to promote this image of the
“political question doctrine”—even if such a doctrine had not been
accepted by the Supreme Court.
Legal process theory had a profound impact on the field of federal courts. Process theorists like Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler,
influenced by their hero Felix Frankfurter, “defin[ed] the pedagogic
canon” of the field for generations.18 The influence of process theory
thus helps explain why, by the mid-twentieth century, much of the
legal community assumed that there was a “political question doctrine” that could define—and constrain—the federal courts’ judicial
review power.
The Supreme Court, however, never adopted the political question doctrine envisioned by legal process theorists. That may be in
large part because the legal process emphasis on a restrained judiciary
was in serious tension with the Supreme Court’s view of itself in the
mid-twentieth century as “supreme in the exposition of . . . the
Constitution.”19 Instead, I argue that the Court in Baker v. Carr
articulated a new political question doctrine (the “modern political
question doctrine”) that could serve, not as a doctrine of judicial
restraint (or subservience), but as a source of judicial power.20 First, in
a part of the opinion that has often been overlooked by scholars,
Baker signaled the demise of the traditional political question doctrine. The Baker Court declared that it would no longer enforce the
17

See infra Part III.C.
Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 690 (1989) (reviewing PAUL
M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988)); see infra Part III.C.
19 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). In Cooper, the Court asserted its
“supremacy” vis-à-vis state and local governments. Following Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), the Court used its political question cases to assert its supremacy vis-à-vis the other
branches of the federal government. See infra Part IV.A.
20 Notably, my focus here is on the political question doctrine as crafted and applied by
the Supreme Court in Baker and subsequent cases. There is an interesting question
whether the doctrine has been applied differently by the lower federal courts. Such an
inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article, although I hope to pursue it in future work.
18
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political branches’ factual determinations, whether they “be right or
wrong.”21 Instead, the Court would independently decide both the
legal and the factual issues arising in any case or controversy.22
Second, the Court took control of (what existed of) the constitutional
side of the doctrine: “Deciding whether a matter has in any measure
been committed by the Constitution to another branch . . . is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”23 The
Court thereby claimed the power to decide whether, and the extent to
which, any other branch may be involved in constitutional
decisionmaking.
This analysis has important implications for scholarship in federal
courts and constitutional law. First, this historical account demonstrates that the modern political question doctrine cannot be justified
on the basis of a long historical pedigree; that doctrine, I argue, did
not exist until the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr.
Moreover, this analysis turns on its head the assumption of most
scholars that the modern doctrine is at odds with judicial supremacy.24
Under the modern doctrine, the Court asserts for itself the power to
decide who decides any constitutional question.25 With control over
that first-order question, the Court can conclude not only that an issue
is textually committed to the President or to a chamber of Congress
but also that an issue is committed to the Court itself. In fact, that is
how the Court since Baker has most often used its political question
cases—to claim that various constitutional issues are committed to the
21

Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
See infra Part IV.A.
23 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added).
24 E.g., Barkow, supra note 3, at 242; see also David Orentlicher, Conflicts of Interest
and the Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 746 (2002) (“[T]he political question
doctrine creates a real tension with the principle of judicial supremacy.”). Indeed, scholars
who favor judicial supremacy tend to strongly oppose the political question doctrine. E.g.,
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 96–97, 98–101 (1987).
Conversely, those who doubt that the Supreme Court should have the final word on all
constitutional questions tend to defend the doctrine or argue for its expansion. E.g., MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9, 107–08 (1999);
Mulhern, supra note 3, at 99–100; see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 209–10 (2004) (noting with
approval that the doctrine ensures that some matters are “wholly beyond judicial
scrutiny”); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 979–80
(2004) (doubting that arguments in favor of judicial supremacy, and opposing the political
question doctrine, should apply to foreign affairs cases).
25 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution.”); infra Part IV.A.
22
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Court, and not to a political branch.26 Scholars may disagree over
whether the Supreme Court should have such a power to allocate
interpretive authority over constitutional questions—a view that likely
depends on one’s attitude toward judicial supremacy.27 My goal here
is to demonstrate, contrary to the assumption of most scholars, that
the modern political question doctrine is a species of—not a limitation
on—judicial supremacy.
I develop this historical account of the political question doctrine
as follows. Part I describes the traditional doctrine of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, recounting how courts treated as conclusive the political branches’ determination of certain factual issues
but showed no such subservience as to constitutional questions. Part II
explains that the Supreme Court continued to apply this traditional
doctrine through the mid-twentieth century, but that a new type of
“political question” case also emerged. Part III documents how academics began to treat the fledging group of constitutional cases as the
political question doctrine. Part IV examines how the Court in Baker
v. Carr and subsequent cases transformed the political question doctrine into a source of judicial power.
I
REDISCOVERING

THE

TRADITIONAL POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE

The modern political question doctrine serves, in theory, to identify constitutional issues that are “committed” to another branch of
government and thus outside the scope of judicial review.28 Although
scholars today often assume that this doctrine has deep historical
roots, the modern doctrine differs significantly from the doctrine
applied by courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—
26

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.C. Jurists, scholars, political actors, and members of the general
public often assume that the Supreme Court should be in charge of constitutional
decisionmaking. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14 (2009) (arguing that
the “American people have decided to cede” this power “to the Justices”); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 5 (2007) (“Through
much of American history, presidents have found it in their interest to defer to the
Court . . . . The strategic calculations of political leaders lay the political foundations for
judicial supremacy.”); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1385 (1997) (advocating the Court’s
role “as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning”). But a growing number of
scholars advocate departmentalism—the notion that each branch has an independent role
in defining constitutional meaning. E.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270, 1279, 1303
(1996); see sources cited infra notes 325–26 and accompanying text.
28 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993).
27
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what I refer to as the “traditional political question doctrine.”29
Under the traditional doctrine, political questions were not constitutional questions but instead were factual determinations made by the
political branches that courts treated as conclusive in the course of
deciding a case or controversy.30
Although a few modern scholars have noticed (some of) these
early cases, they have not understood the scope and nature of this
traditional political question doctrine.31 Most notably, building on the
modern assumption that “political questions” are “constitutional
questions,” Louis Henkin suggested that, if the Court in its early cases
did not refrain from adjudicating constitutional issues, there must
29 Some readers may be interested in my methodology in uncovering the history of the
political question doctrine: In order to ensure that my research would be as exhaustive as
possible, I asked a research assistant to compile a database with every Supreme Court case
that used the word “political question” (or used those words in close proximity) from 1789
until the present day. The research assistant added cases that were later described as
“political question” cases, even if those cases did not come up in the initial search. With the
help of other research assistants, I then read through the cases. I also read—
chronologically—scholarship that used the term “political question” from around the 1880s
through the 1960s, so that I could get a sense of the different ways in which commentators
had used the term over time. That review led me to conclude, as I describe in Part III, that
there was a change in the understanding of the concept of “political question” in the early
to mid-twentieth century. To confirm this point, I read through late nineteenth and early
twentieth century treatises that discuss the term “political question.” With the help of
research assistants, I also examined the briefs and transcripts underlying a number of the
precedents discussed in this Article, including Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849),
United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866), Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1875), Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939),
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It would
be impossible in the space of a law review article to describe every one of my findings or to
articulate all the nuance in the history. But I lay out the most important finding: There was
a traditional political question doctrine. The cases that I highlight in Part I.A are, in my
view, illustrative of that doctrine.
30 Commentators also used the term “political question” to refer to the right of states
to assert their sovereign “political rights” in court—an issue that arose during
Reconstruction. See Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 76–77 (1868) (noting that
Georgia’s challenge to the Reconstruction Acts “call[ed] for the judgment of the court
upon political questions, and, upon rights, not of persons or property, but of a political
character”); 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A
CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION § 385, at
816–18 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., 1899) (describing, in addition to the traditional cases
discussed in this Article, Georgia v. Stanton and Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
475 (1867), as political question cases). But scholars today correctly understand these cases
as part of modern standing doctrine. Harrison, supra note 11, at 1373 n.10; see Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1367–68,
1382 & nn.28–29 (1973) (pointing out that “[n]o doubts . . . were raised” about the
justiciability of a constitutional challenge to the Reconstruction Acts “when personal rights
were at stake” in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869)). I therefore do not focus
on such cases in this project.
31 For an explanation of how I uncovered the history discussed here, see supra note 29.
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have been no political question doctrine, even during this early
period.32 But that is a misunderstanding of the history.33 There was
indeed a doctrine—one that applied broadly in both civil and criminal
cases and in both federal and state court. One of the central goals of
this Article is to familiarize modern readers with this early doctrine.
This background is crucial to understanding how far from its roots the
current doctrine has evolved.34
A. Political Questions as Rules of Decision
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both
federal and state courts viewed certain issues as “political questions,”
including which government controlled a territory;35 the date on
which a war began or ended;36 whether the United States continued to
have a treaty with a foreign country;37 and whether a certain group of
32 See Henkin, supra note 3, at 600–01, 608–13 (doubting that there has ever been a
“doctrine requiring abstention from judicial review of ‘political questions,’” at least outside
the Guarantee Clause context, and focusing on cases involving constitutional claims, but
also citing a few nineteenth-century cases involving foreign relations). I discuss below
Professor Henkin’s additional assertion that there is also no “political question doctrine”
today. See infra notes 314–15 and accompanying text. More recently, Gwynne Skinner has
similarly argued that “the Supreme Court has never applied the ‘political question
doctrine’ as a true justiciability doctrine”—although Professor Skinner goes further than
Professor Henkin (and this Article) in suggesting that even the Court’s post-1912
Guarantee Clause cases did not treat that issue as nonjusticiable. See Gwynne Skinner,
Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The “Political Question Doctrine” as
a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 427, 427–28, 434–39, 441 (2014); see also id. at 428
n.6 (noting agreement with Henkin). But neither Professor Henkin nor Professor Skinner
seems to recognize that there was a different doctrine in the nineteenth century—or that
this doctrine applied in both civil and criminal cases, and in both federal and state court.
See also supra note 11 (noting other scholarship that has discussed some of the relevant
early cases, without recognizing the nature or breadth of the early doctrine).
33 Professor Henkin also assumed (inaccurately) that the early cases involved no
“extra-ordinary deference” to the political branches. Henkin, supra note 3, at 612; see infra
note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the subservience of the courts as to factual
determinations that were deemed political questions).
34 For a discussion of how the current doctrine differs from the traditional doctrine, see
Part IV.B.
35 See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign, de jure
or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments . . . conclusively binds the judges.”); 2
TUCKER, supra note 30, § 385, at 816 (“[Judiciary powers] accept the determination of the
political departments . . . as conclusive [on w]hat is the de facto government of another
country.”).
36 See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 56, at 101 (3d ed. 1910) (“[T]he judicial tribunals must follow the political departments
[as to the existence of a state of war] and accept their determination as conclusive.”).
37 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285, 288 (1902); 2 WESTEL WOODBURY
WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 582, at 1007 (1910).
Courts also treated as a “political question” whether a foreign diplomat had the power to
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Native Americans constituted a “tribe.”38 Although jurists and
scholars in that era often described these issues as “questions of
fact,”39 most such political questions would likely now be considered
mixed questions of fact and law.40 (For ease of exposition, I generally
refer to these determinations as factual decisions, in keeping with the
nineteenth-century usage.41)
My concern here is not so much with which subject matters fell
into the category of “political questions” but rather with how these
political questions impacted a judicial decision. Jurists during this
early period did not dismiss as nonjusticiable an issue that presented a
political question. Instead, the courts enforced and applied the political branches’ determination in the course of deciding a case or controversy. In other words, the courts treated the political branches’
determination as a factual rule of decision for the case. Both case law
and scholarship, including late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century
treatises, confirm that this doctrine was the heart of the “political
question doctrine” during this early period.42
negotiate or terminate a treaty on behalf of his government. E.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 635, 657 (1854); 2 WILLOUGHBY, supra, at 1007.
38 See In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 751, 755–57 (1867) (treating as
conclusive Congress’s determination that the Shawnee Indians were a tribe and concluding
as a matter of law that the State of Kansas could not tax the Shawnee); United States v.
Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1866) (“[I]t is the rule of this court to follow the action
of the executive and other political departments . . . . If by them those Indians are
recognized as a tribe, this court must do the same.”).
39 E.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (declaring that
“when the executive branch of the government assume[s] . . . a fact in regard to the
sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department”); 2
WILLOUGHBY, supra note 37, § 577, at 999 (stating that the judiciary would treat as binding
legislative or executive determinations that a “certain set of facts . . . , a given status,
exists”).
40 Some of these questions depended on the political branches’ determinations of
international or foreign law. That is true, for example, of executive decisions as to whether
the United States was still bound by a treaty and whether a foreign diplomat could (under
the law of his home country) negotiate a treaty. See supra note 37.
41 My analysis here does not turn on the distinction between factual and mixed
questions; as I show below, no matter how one draws that line, the traditional doctrine did
not encompass constitutional questions (that is, the determination whether a statute or
other governmental action complied with the Constitution). This distinction would,
however, be important for any scholarship evaluating the early judiciary’s willingness to
treat as conclusive the political branches’ determination of (what we would today view as)
mixed questions or even pure questions of international or foreign law. See supra notes 37,
40.
42 See sources cited supra notes 35–38; see also 2 TUCKER, supra note 30, § 385, at 816
(observing that the judiciary must “accept the determination of the political departments
of the government as conclusive” on political questions); Note, Determination of Status of
Foreign Territory, 16 HARV. L. REV. 134, 134 (1901) (noting a court must “follow the
ruling of the political department” on political questions). As noted, the only other
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A few examples will help illustrate how courts applied the traditional doctrine. Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co. involved a dispute
over an insurance contract. The master of a vessel that was confiscated
by the Buenos Ayres government sought the insurance proceeds,43 but
the insurance company refused to pay out on the policy, arguing that
the master was himself responsible for the loss of the ship.44 The
Buenos Ayres government had warned the master that it would confiscate the vessel if he attempted to dock at the Falkland Islands in
South America—a territory that Buenos Ayres claimed to control.45
The master, however, denied that Buenos Ayres controlled the territory and contended that he was therefore justified in ignoring the foreign government’s warning.46
The Supreme Court held that the question as to which government controlled the Falkland Islands was a political question, such
that “the action of the American government on this subject is binding
and conclusive on this Court.”47 Noting that the executive had
“denied the jurisdiction which [Buenos Ayres] assumed to exercise
over the Falkland islands,”48 the Supreme Court declared that this
“fact must be taken and acted on by this Court as thus asserted and
maintained,” “whether the executive be right or wrong.”49 In
Williams, the executive’s determination “materially affect[ed]” the
central legal question in the dispute: whether the master of the vessel
had acted appropriately.50 The Court found that the master “violated
no regulation which he was bound to respect” and, accordingly,
directed the insurance company to cover the cost of the lost vessel.51
Kennett v. Chambers was an action to enforce a contract arising
out of Texas’s war for independence against Mexico.52 In order to
raise money for the war effort, General T. Jefferson Chambers of the
Texan army contracted to sell some land located in Texas.53 According
common use of the term “political question” was to refer to the assertion of “sovereign
rights” in court—a matter now considered part of standing doctrine. See supra note 30.
43 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 418–19 (1839).
44 Id. at 419–20.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.; see also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign,
de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question . . . .”).
48 Williams, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 420.
49 Id. (“[I]t is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the Court to determine,
whether the executive be right or wrong.”).
50 Id. at 421 (“The decision of the first point materially affects the second, which turns
upon the conduct of the master.”).
51 Id.
52 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 45–46 (1852).
53 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-6\NYU602.txt

1920

unknown

Seq: 13

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2-DEC-15

11:58

[Vol. 90:1908

to the complaint, although the plaintiffs paid $12,500 for the property—money that the general used to purchase supplies for the Texan
army—General Chambers refused to convey the property to them.54
Writing for the Court in Kennett, Chief Justice Taney explained
that this contract would be illegal and unenforceable, if it were a contract to support a “rebellion” against a government with which the
United States had diplomatic ties (as the United States did with
Mexico).55 A crucial issue, therefore, was whether at the time the contract was signed Texas was independent or still part of Mexico (and,
thus, engaging in a “rebellion”). The Court stated that Texas’s status
was a political question, such that until the executive “recognized
[Texas] as an independent state, the judicial tribunals of the country
were bound to consider the old order of things as having continued,
and to regard Texas as a part of the Mexican territory.”56 In this case,
although Texas had declared its independence before the contract was
signed (and considerable evidence suggested that Texas was in fact
independent),57 the political branches did not recognize Texas as
independent until several months later.58 Accordingly, the contract in
Kennett was unenforceable; General Chambers could keep his land.59
The traditional political question doctrine was not limited to civil
disputes like Williams and Kennett but also applied in criminal prosecutions. In United States v. Holliday,60 defendant Lorton Holliday was
charged with violating a statute that prohibited the sale of “any spirituous liquor or wine to any Indian under the charge of any . . . Indian
agent appointed by the United States.”61 Holliday had sold liquor to a
54

Id.
See id. at 49–50 (discussing evidence that the contract was made with the
understanding that the payments would allow for General T. Jefferson Chambers to gather
supplies for his military force, which was not sanctioned by the United States, and finding
that if this was the purpose of the contract, the contract was “not only void, but the parties
who advanced the money were liable to be punished in a criminal prosecution”).
56 Id. at 51; see also id. at 50–51 (“[T]he question whether Texas had or had not at that
time become an independent state, was a question for that department of our government
exclusively which is charged with our foreign relations.”).
57 See id. at 47–48 (noting that the President had stated in one message that “‘[i]t is
true, with regard to Texas, the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its invading
army defeated, . . . and all present power to control the newly organized Government of
Texas annihilated’” although the executive’s official position was still that Texas was part
of Mexico).
58 Id. at 46–47.
59 Id. at 52 (“We therefore hold this contract to be illegal and void . . . .”).
60 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866).
61 Act of February 13, 1862, An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act to Regulate
Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to Preserve Peace on the Frontiers,’
Approved June Thirteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Thirty-Four, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338, 339
(repealed 1934); see Transcript of Record at 1–2, United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 407 (1866) (No. 119) (setting out the alleged facts and charge in the indictment).
55
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man named Otibsko, who was said to be a member of the Chippewa.62
Notably, Otibsko would be “[an] Indian under the charge of any . . .
Indian agent” within the meaning of the statute only if the Chippewa
constituted a tribe.63
The Court held that it was bound by the political branches’ determination that the group was in fact a tribe: “[I]t is the rule of this
court to follow the action of the executive and other political departments of the government . . . . If by them those Indians are recognized
as a tribe, this court must do the same.”64 The Court then went on to
independently determine the remaining issues in the case, rejecting
Holliday’s contention that Otibsko was no longer affiliated with the
tribe65 and holding that the federal statute at issue was a proper exercise of Congress’s authority under the Indian Commerce Clause.66
The Court thus upheld Holliday’s conviction.67
The traditional political question doctrine applied not only in
various federal cases but also in state court.68 A lawsuit in New York
state court, Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario,69
offers an illustration. The Bolshevik government of Russia brought
suit against a movie company, seeking damages for breach of a contract to provide moving picture machines and other supplies.70
Although the Bolsheviks had clearly controlled Russia since late 1917,
the United States government did not yet recognize the regime as the
62 See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 418 (1866) (setting out the
evidence supporting the claim that Otibsko was a member of the tribe); Transcript of
Record at 1–2, supra note 61 (providing the name of the Indian and his tribe).
63 The government’s brief indicates that the Department of the Interior appointed
“agents” only to work with recognized tribes. Accordingly, unless the Chippewa were a
recognized tribe, the statute would not apply. Brief of the United States at 25, 31–32,
United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866) (No. 119). Likewise, Otibsko had to
in fact be a member of the tribe. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
64 Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 419.
65 Id. at 410, 420.
66 Id. at 417. Holliday argued that Congress lacked power under the Indian Commerce
Clause to regulate the sale of liquor outside Indian territory, particularly when (as in his
case) the sale took place wholly within one state. The Court rejected this claim. See id. at
418 (“[I]f commerce . . . is carried on with an Indian tribe, or with a member of such tribe,
it is subject to be regulated by Congress . . . .”).
67 Id. at 420.
68 In fact, state courts applied their own traditional political question doctrine, treating
as conclusive the determination of state officials on certain “political questions.” See, e.g.,
State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178, 184 (1873) (declaring, in a case where the defendant had
allegedly committed a crime on Smutty Nose Island, that it would treat as conclusive the
state political branches’ determination that the island was part of Maine).
69 235 N.Y. 255 (1923).
70 See E.D.D., International Recognition and the National Courts, 21 MICH. L. REV.
531, 531 (1923) (recounting the facts of the case).
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leader of the country.71 The state court found that it was bound by the
political branches’ determination: “Who is the sovereign of a territory
is a political question. In any case where that question is in dispute the
courts are bound by the decision reached by those departments.”72
The court held, as a matter of law, that such an unrecognized government lacked standing to sue in a New York state court.73
The above cases illustrate several important features of the traditional political question doctrine. First, although courts did not themselves adjudicate political questions, neither did they dismiss as
nonjusticiable an issue that turned on a political question. Instead, the
courts enforced and applied the political branches’ determinations in
the course of resolving the underlying case or controversy. 74 Moreover, I want to underscore the depth of the courts’ deference—indeed,
subservience—to the political branches on these political questions.
The federal and state courts treated the political branches’ conclusions
as factual rules of decision, even if it appeared that the political
branches got the facts wrong. Thus, in Kennett v. Chambers, it made
no difference that Texas did in fact appear to be independent of
Mexico at the time the contract was signed.75 Nor was the state court
in Cibrario moved by “the patent and notorious fact that the Soviet
71 In February 1917, the Russian Emperor abdicated his throne, and a provisional
government took control of the country. This control was short-lived, however, and by
October 1917, the Bolshevik government controlled the nation, which it renamed the
Soviet Union. ANTHONY D’AGOSTINO, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917–1945, at 40
(2011). The United States government did not recognize the Soviet government until 1933.
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 211 (1942) (noting the recognition).
72 Cibrario, 235 N.Y. at 262–63.
73 Id. at 257, 260 (noting that “[i]f recognized,” a foreign government “undoubtedly . . .
may” be a plaintiff in a New York state court but finding “no precedent” for the
proposition that “a power not recognized by the United States may seek relief in our
courts”).
74 Accordingly, the Court’s only goal was to discern—and then apply—the political
branches’ determinations on these “political questions.” Although that was often clear,
there were cases where the Court struggled to figure out what the political branches had
concluded (particularly if there appeared to be disagreement between Congress and the
executive). See, e.g., Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257, 265–70, 272 (1907) (noting, in a tax
case that turned on whether the Isle of Pines (an island off the coast of Cuba) belonged to
Cuba or the United States, that the executive and some members of Congress disagreed on
this issue, although concluding that the weight of the evidence suggested that the “United
States” believed Cuba had at least de facto control, which was sufficient to render the
individual liable for the importation tax); see also Benjamin H. Williams, The Isle of Pines
Treaty, 3 FOREIGN AFF. 689, 690–91 (1925) (noting that the issue of control over the Isle of
Pines was politically charged because a number of Americans had moved to the island
during the American occupation of Cuba from 1898 to 1902 and advocated American
control of the island).
75 See Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 47–48 (1852) (noting that the
President had himself stated that Mexican control had been “annihilated” within Texas,
but that the executive nevertheless viewed Texas as part of Mexico).
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Republic [was] the government of Russia.”76 In each case, the courts
followed the executive’s determination, “whether the executive be
right or wrong.”77
Second, courts treated as conclusive only the political branches’
determination of the political question—and then went on to resolve
the remaining factual and legal issues in the case. Thus, in Holliday,
although the Court applied the political branches’ decision as to the
Chippewa’s tribal status, the Court independently examined the other
issues in the case, including Holliday’s constitutional claim that
Congress lacked power under the Indian Commerce Clause to regulate the sale of liquor outside Indian territory.78
Third, the traditional doctrine was not a matter of Article III
jurisdiction; the doctrine, after all, applied in both state and federal
court.79 Indeed, it does not appear that the doctrine was a strict rule
(jurisdictional or otherwise). Jurists and scholars often suggested that
if the political branches made no determination on a given “political
question,” the courts would have to decide that factual issue in order
to resolve the case.80 Furthermore, some nineteenth-century cases
indicated that Congress could, by statute, delegate the determination
of certain political questions to the judiciary—and thereby convert a
“political question” into a “judicial question.”81 The traditional polit76 Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L.
REV. 485, 501–02 (1924) (noting that federal courts during this era also treated as
conclusive the executive’s determination, “[i]n spite of the patent and notorious fact that
the Soviet Republic is the government of Russia today”).
77 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839). Accordingly, Professor
Henkin was incorrect in asserting that the Court’s early cases involved no “extra-ordinary
deference to the President.” Henkin, supra note 3, at 611–12. Although the Court did not
“abst[ain] from judicial review” of constitutional questions, the Court did apply what most
commentators today would likely view as “extra-ordinary deference,” when it declared
itself bound by the political branches’ factual determinations, whether they “be right or
wrong.”
78 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
79 See U.S. CONST. art. III; Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund,
500 U.S. 72, 78 n.4 (1991) (“[T]he requirements of Article III plainly [do] not apply [in
state court].”); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (making a similar point).
Likewise, other non-Article III courts, like territorial courts, treated as conclusive the
political branches’ determinations of “political questions.” See Watts v. United States, 1
Wash. Terr. 288, 295–96, 299 (1870) (treating as conclusive, in a criminal case, the political
branches’ determination that San Juan Island was part of the United States).
80 See In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 503 (1892) (suggesting in dicta that, if Congress and
the executive fail to decide which country controls a given territory, the court must do so);
QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS § 107, at 172–73
(1922) (“[I]f the controversy involves ‘a political question’ the courts hold that they must
follow the decision of the political organs . . . . Sometimes, however, no definite decision
has been given by those organs. In such cases, the courts [have given] a decision thereon.”).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 734–36 (1832) (declaring
that Congress by statute had “disclaimed [the boundary dispute at issue] as a political
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ical question doctrine, accordingly, seemed to be viewed as a background default rule: To the extent that the political branches decided a
given political question, the courts were bound by that determination.
Finally, as Holliday illustrates, none of these early cases treated
constitutional questions as political questions. Constitutional considerations may have informed whether a particular factual issue was
deemed a political question. For example, courts likely assumed that
the executive and legislature had superior constitutional authority
over (and greater expertise with respect to) foreign affairs and relations with Indian tribes and, for that reason, followed the political
branches’ determination of matters like de facto control over a foreign
territory and the tribal status of a group of Native Americans. 82 But
aside from dicta in Luther v. Borden (discussed below),83 there is little
indication that either the federal or the state courts viewed themselves
as bound by the political branches’ determinations of constitutional
questions. On the contrary, there is considerable evidence that the
early judiciary assumed that it could independently determine all constitutional questions that arose in a case or controversy.84
B. Understanding Luther v. Borden
The description of the traditional political question doctrine provided above sheds light on Luther v. Borden, a case that is often associated with the modern doctrine. Many commentators describe Luther
as holding that questions under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV,
which provides that the “United States shall guarantee to every state
question for the legislative department to decide, and enjoined it on us as purely judicial”);
see also Field, supra note 76, at 499 (“Congress can divest a political question of its
character by providing that it be settled by the courts.”).
82 See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1854) (stating that courts must
treat as conclusive the executive’s decision that a foreign diplomat had the power to
negotiate a treaty because otherwise “it would be impossible for the executive . . . to
conduct our foreign relations . . . and fulfil the duties which the Constitution has imposed
upon it”); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50 (1852) (“[I]f we undertook to
[determine Texas’s status] . . . , we should take upon ourselves the exercise of political
authority, for which a judicial tribunal is wholly unfit, and which the Constitution has
conferred exclusively upon another department.”); BLACK, supra note 36, § 56, at 100
(offering as one reason behind the doctrine that “courts ought not to usurp the functions of
the political branches . . . nor intrude upon their jurisdiction”); see also Note, supra note
42, at 134–35 (“[T]he judiciary is bound by the decision of the executive department in
political questions” because “[c]ontrary decisions would be a source of embarrassment,
and might involve the state in international complications.”).
83 See infra Part I.B.
84 See infra Parts I.C, I.D; cf. 2 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 37, § 577, at 999 (stating that
the same considerations that supported treating certain factual questions as “political
questions” did not permit the executive or legislature “to violate constitutional
provisions”).
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. . . a republican form of government,” are outside the scope of judicial
review.85 But a closer look reveals that the Court in Luther issued no
such holding; in fact, Luther was, in most respects, a traditional political question case.
The case arose out of the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island. A
group of citizens led by Thomas Dorr objected to the existing state
constitution, which significantly restricted the right to vote,86 and
sought in 1841 to form an alternative government.87 (Although Dorr’s
supporters did not ultimately gain control over Rhode Island,88 the
Dorr Rebellion did lead to considerable reform.89) During this rebellion, Luther Borden, a representative of the existing “charter government,” broke into Martin Luther’s house to arrest him for unlawfully
supporting the Dorr regime.90 Luther subsequently sued Borden for
trespass, and Borden defended himself on the ground that he had
acted on behalf of the charter government, which had imposed martial
law during the crisis.91 Luther responded that, at the time of the trespass, the Dorr group was the government of Rhode Island.92 Accordingly, one of the central questions in the case was which
“government” was the true government of the state.
In the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taney announced that
this question—which government controlled Rhode Island—was a
political question, such that the judiciary would accept as binding the

85 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Barkow, supra note 3, at 255 (asserting that, in Luther, “the
Court . . . conclude[d] that the interpretation of the Guarantee Clause rests with
Congress”); Zachary M. Vaughan, Note, The Reach of the Writ: Boumediene v. Bush and
the Political Question Doctrine, 99 GEO. L.J. 869, 872 (2011) (“The Luther Court’s
declaration that the Guarantee Clause is a nonjusticiable political question has been
consistently followed.”).
86 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 86–87
(1972) (noting that “[t]he royal charter” from 1663 “had been retained as the state
constitution” and generally restricted suffrage to real property owners); see GEORGE M.
DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831–1861, at 27 (1976).
87 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 35–36 (1849) (discussing how individuals
who were “dissatisfied with the charter government” sought to create a new constitution);
WIECEK, supra note 86, at 89–92, 94–95 (discussing these events).
88 See WIECEK, supra note 86, at 95 (noting that the newly formed Dorr government
met for two days and then adjourned).
89 See id. at 99 (noting that Rhode Island adopted a new constitution that greatly
expanded suffrage and thus “Dorr and his sympathizers . . . lost the battle but won the
war”).
90 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 37; see also supra note 86 (noting that Rhode Island at
this time used its royal charter as its state constitution).
91 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34.
92 Id. at 34–35.
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determination of the political branches.93 In light of the precedents
discussed above, this conclusion was unsurprising.94 The Court
declared that Congress had the primary authority for determining
which government was established in a state—a determination
Congress made when it admitted senators and representatives from
that state.95 The Court then stated the following (a passage that
would be the focus of subsequent commentary):
Under [the Guarantee Clause] it rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a State. For as the United
States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress
must necessarily decide what government is established in the State
before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when
the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the
councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which
they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized
by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding
on every other department of the government, and could not be
questioned in a judicial tribunal.96

In this case, “Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy,” because the Dorr government did not last long enough to
select members of Congress—and thereby give Congress two slates of
93 Id. at 47 (“[W]hether [the people of a state] have . . . establish[ed] a new
[government], is a question to be settled by the political power. And when that power has
decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.”).
94 See supra Part I.A. It is far more surprising that the Chief Justice at one point
suggested that the determination as to which government controlled a state was a question
of state law, such that the Court was bound by the Rhode Island courts’ recognition of the
charter government. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 40. Indeed, some commentators have
treated Luther as a case in which federal courts deferred to state courts on a state law
issue. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and
Reconstruction, 1865–1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 166–67 (1984). Although that is a
plausible reading, much of the opinion treats the decision as one for the political branches.
Moreover, it would be odd to leave this determination to the state courts; a court must
assume the legitimacy of the constitution that creates it—as the Court in Luther seemed to
recognize. See Walter F. Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80
U. PA. L. REV. 54, 90 (1931) (“Once a government is in operation, a court, constituting
part of the organization thereunder, could hardly declare that government ineffective.”);
see also Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 39–40 (“[T]he question [which government exists in a
State] . . . has not heretofore been recognized as a judicial one in any of the State
courts. . . . Indeed, we do not see how the question could be tried and judicially decided in
a State court. . . . [I]f a State court . . . should come to the conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government, it
would cease to be a court, and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the
question it undertook to try.”). In any event, if Luther was a “state law” case, then every
statement about the political branches was clearly dicta, including the one that I focus on
here: the notion that Congress controls the interpretation of the Guarantee Clause.
95 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
96 Id.
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representatives from which to choose.97 Absent a congressional determination, the Court looked to the actions of the executive branch,
which had statutory authority to put down insurrections within
states.98 Although President John Tyler did not send in the militia to
support the charter government, he had indicated his willingness to do
so, if necessary.99 Accordingly, the executive had, in effect, recognized
the charter government as the government of Rhode Island.100 This
determination, the Court declared, was as “authoritative” as the executive’s recognition of the government of a foreign country.101
The Court then went on to decide the major legal issue in the
case: whether the charter government was justified in declaring martial law during the Dorr Rebellion. The Court upheld the use of martial law, reasoning that “unquestionably, a State may use its military
power to put down an armed insurrection.”102 Interestingly, in this
part of the opinion, the Court expressed a view on the meaning of the
Guarantee Clause. Chief Justice Taney declared that
“[u]nquestionably a military government, established as the permanent government of the State, would not be a republican government,
and it would be the duty of Congress to overthrow it.”103 In this case,
however, there was no such problem, because the declaration of martial law “was intended merely for the crisis,” not to establish a permanent military regime.104
Luther v. Borden was, in many respects, a traditional political
question case. The Court treated as conclusive the political branches’
factual determination that the charter government controlled Rhode
Island, and then went on to resolve the legal issue in the dispute. The
case has, however, been incorporated into the modern political question doctrine because of the Court’s statement that Congress has the
power to determine not only “what government is the established one
in a State” but also “whether it is republican” in form.105 As some
97 See id. (“[A]s no senators or representatives were elected under the authority of the
[Dorr] government . . . Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy.”).
98 Id. at 42–43.
99 Id. at 44; see also DENNISON, supra note 86, at 72, 121 (during the crisis, President
John Tyler made clear that he “would support the charter government at all costs”).
100 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44.
101 Id. (“In the case of foreign nations, the government acknowledged by the President
is always recognized in the courts of justice.”).
102 Id. at 46. Justice Woodbury dissented only on this point. See id. at 51, 70 (Woodbury,
J., dissenting) (disputing “only . . . the points in issue concerning martial law”).
103 Id. at 45 (majority opinion).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 42.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-6\NYU602.txt

1928

unknown

Seq: 21

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2-DEC-15

11:58

[Vol. 90:1908

scholars have recognized, this language was dicta.106 That is true not
only because (as the Court stated) “Congress was not called upon to
decide the controversy”107 but also because the plaintiff in Luther did
not challenge the charter government as “unrepublican”; he claimed
only that the charter government had been superseded by the Dorr
regime.108
But I also want to emphasize another point that has often gone
unnoticed by modern scholars. Although Luther has been cited for the
proposition that Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable (as the
term is used in the modern political question doctrine), that is not
what Chief Justice Taney’s opinion declared. Instead, Chief Justice
Taney was, albeit only in dicta, extending the traditional political
question doctrine to an area of constitutional law. That is, in adjudicating cases and controversies, the Court would have to treat as
“binding” Congress’s determination as to whether a state government
was “republican.”109
It is not clear why Chief Justice Taney included this dicta about
the Guarantee Clause—dicta that is hard to reconcile with the Chief
Justice’s own willingness to interpret the Clause later on in the Luther
opinion. It is possible that Chief Justice Taney (later, the author of
Dred Scott v. Sandford) was thinking ahead to future disputes over
slavery.110 During the mid-nineteenth century, a number of abolition106 See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 535 (1962) (noting this “unfortunate
dicta”); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517, 589–91 (1966) (describing the Court’s declaration as “dicta”).
107 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
108 The plaintiff could have made a reasonable claim that the charter government
violated the Guarantee Clause, given the suffrage restrictions in the charter constitution.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text. But my review of the record indicates that the
plaintiff did not raise such a claim. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 11–18, Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (No. 115) (containing the plaintiff’s offer of proof,
which focused on the fact that the charter government had been superseded and stating, in
its only use of the word “republican,” that the new Dorr government was republican). Nor
does the Court’s opinion indicate that the plaintiff asserted such a claim. See also Currie,
supra note 94, at 166 (similarly observing that “[t]he plaintiff had not relied on the
guarantee clause” in Luther).
109 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
110 Chief Justice Taney later authored the Court’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For discussions of how the Guarantee Clause factored into the
debate over slavery, see WIECEK, supra note 86, at 133–65; Bonfield, supra note 106, at
530–32. Notably, Chief Justice Taney did not mention slavery in his Luther opinion, leading
historian William Wiecek to conclude that he “entirely missed” the implications of that
case for the slavery debate. WIECEK, supra note 86, at 133 (asserting that “Taney was
usually sensitive to the implications of cases before him regarding slavery . . . . Yet in the
Luther case, Taney entirely missed any such implications”). But I see no reason to assume
that Chief Justice Taney overlooked those implications.
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ists argued that every slave state lacked a “republican” form of government.111 By declaring itself bound by Congress’s determination as
to the republican nature of a state government, the Court in Luther
ensured that it would have to reject any such Guarantee Clause challenge to slavery.112 Congress had, after all, since the Founding
accepted representatives and senators from slave states.113
In any event, this passage in Luther was apparently not viewed
for many years as declaring that all Guarantee Clause issues were
“political questions.” As discussed below, the Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (through 1911) adjudicated a
number of Guarantee Clause challenges on the merits. The dicta in
Luther would, however, become important when it was picked up—
and transformed—by the Court in 1912.
C.

Constitutional Questions Were Not Treated as Political
Questions

Throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century,
federal courts adjudicated constitutional questions on the merits,
including issues that are today considered quintessential “political
questions,” such as the validity of constitutional amendments under
Article V and the meaning of the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.114
111 See WIECEK, supra note 86, at 136, 145 (noting that “antislavery thinkers” argued
that “slavery was incompatible with republican government”); Bonfield, supra note 106, at
531 (making a similar point).
112 Such an approach would have been consistent with proslavery arguments of that era.
In response to claims that slavery was at odds with republican government, Southerners
pointed out that Congress had often admitted slave states into the Union “with the explicit
declaration that they were ‘republican in form.’” WIECEK, supra note 86, at 146.
113 The Court, however, was never asked to resolve the question whether slavery was
“unrepublican.” Bonfield, supra note 106, at 537.
114 Likewise, it does not appear that the Court refrained from adjudicating
constitutional questions that arose in the realm of foreign policy or war powers. See JOHN
HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 55 & 176 n.46 (1993) (“[I]n the nineteenth century the hesitation [about
adjudicating cases involving foreign affairs and national security] was not even expressed
by commentators . . . .”). There is a difficult question whether the “plenary power”
doctrine created by the Supreme Court in the late-nineteenth century for immigration
cases was an early version of the modern doctrine of nonjusticiable constitutional
questions, or instead a doctrine of extreme deference to the political branches. See
Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power:
Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
32, 37–38 (describing the “plenary power doctrine” as “a Court-crafted rule of extreme
judicial deference to congressional and executive exercises of the immigration power” and
noting the “analogy” between the plenary power doctrine and the modern political
question doctrine, but stating that “[a] conclusion that immigration cases involve
nonjusticiable political questions is not consistent with applying even a low level of
scrutiny” and doubting that early immigration cases applied something akin to the modern
political question doctrine); see also Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration
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The available evidence thus indicates that jurists and scholars during
this era did not view constitutional questions as “political questions.”
Admittedly, I cannot prove that the nineteenth-century judiciary
would under no circumstances have treated as conclusive a constitutional determination of another branch. It is possible, for example,
that (if faced with the question) the Supreme Court would have
enforced a congressional determination that an “invasion” or “rebellion” required the suspension of habeas corpus.115 Nevertheless, I
have identified no case in which the Court held that it was bound by
the constitutional determination of a political branch. Nor did the
Court dismiss certain constitutional claims as nonjusticiable. Instead,
the Court independently adjudicated constitutional questions in the
course of resolving cases and controversies—precisely the approach
that (as discussed below) was called for in Marbury v. Madison.116
1. Constitutional Amendments
Article V provides that the Constitution may be amended only
with the support of two-thirds of the House of Representatives and
the Senate and three-fourths of the states (voting through state legislatures or conventions).117 Many jurists and scholars today consider
the validity of a constitutional amendment to be a nonjusticiable political question, such that Congress has final—and, apparently, exclusive—authority to determine whether a measure complies with
Article V.118 Indeed, some commentators have argued that it would
Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 383–84 & n.42 (2004) (stating that “[u]nderstood as a doctrine
of judicial deference, the plenary power [doctrine] is a close cousin of the political question
doctrine” but also identifying “an important distinction . . . . At least as a matter of
contemporary plenary power jurisprudence, . . . limited review of immigration law is at
least formally available,” although noting that “early plenary power cases do hint at the
more categorical denial of review that typically accompanies the judicial determination
that a controversy presents a nonjusticiable political question”). A full exploration of the
nature of the plenary power doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. At most, I believe,
the early plenary power cases may be a limited exception to my general finding—that the
Supreme Court during this era did not treat constitutional questions as nonjusticiable.
115 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”). For a powerful argument that such a constitutional question should not be deemed a
political question (even under modern law), see Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political
Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 335 (2006) (observing that “there is no settled authority”
on whether suspension is a political question).
116 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see infra Part I.D.
117 U.S. CONST. art. V.
118 Even scholars who argue that the amendment process should not be a political
question agree that Coleman v. Miller (discussed below in Part II.B), has been construed to
render Article V claims nonjusticiable. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 402
(1983) (noting that “[t]he assumption since Coleman has been” that Congress will decide
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be unwise to permit judicial review of the amendment process,
because that is the only mechanism by which Congress can “overrule”
what it views as an erroneous Supreme Court constitutional
decision.119
That was not, however, the assumption of the early Court.120 For
example, in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the Supreme Court considered,
and rejected, an argument that the Eleventh Amendment was invalid
because it had never been presented to the President for his signature.121 Notably, the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to overrule
the Supreme Court’s own decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, which held
that a state could be subjected to suit in the federal courts, absent its

“any question concerning the validity of ratifications”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General
Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 677, 718 (1993) (“Coleman . . . has come to be regarded as standing for the
proposition that legal issues presented by the amendment process . . . are political
questions . . . committed to Congress . . . .”).
119 See Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 749–50 (arguing that “courts should find a political
question when their involvement would entail a serious institutional conflict of interest for
the judiciary,” such as in the areas of impeachment and constitutional amendment);
Scharpf, supra note 106, at 588–89 (arguing that the judiciary should treat the amendment
process as a political question in order to ensure a democratic check on judicial review); see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 849, 851, 853–54 (1994) (reiterating his view that there should perhaps be
no political question doctrine but arguing that to the extent there is such a doctrine it
should apply to the amendment process, given that “[c]onstitutional amendments are the
only way for the political process to directly overturn a Supreme Court decision
interpreting the Constitution”).
120 The early Court assumed that it could rule on the amendment process, like other
constitutional questions. See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text. I have, however,
found a contrary view in dicta from one case. Notably, this decision did not suggest that the
amendment process was nonjusticiable in the sense of the modern political question
doctrine, but instead suggested that the traditional political question doctrine might apply.
See White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649 (1872) (stating in dicta that Georgia could
not “deny the validity of her ratification of the [Reconstruction] amendments. The action
of Congress upon the subject cannot be inquired into. The case is clearly one in which the
judicial is bound to follow the action of the political department of the government, and is
concluded by it”).
121 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381–82 & n.(a) (1798) (holding that the President’s veto power
“applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing to do with the
proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution”); see U.S. CONST. amend. XI
(“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
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consent.122 But there is no indication that the Supreme Court hesitated in adjudicating Hollingsworth on the merits.123
Likewise, in the early twentieth century,124 the Court addressed
on the merits a series of substantive and procedural challenges to the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments (involving prohibition and
women’s suffrage, respectively).125 For example, in Leser v. Garnett,
the Court held that the Nineteenth Amendment did not result in “so
great an addition to the electorate” as to be outside the scope of
Congress’s power under Article V.126 The Court clearly did not
assume that Congress alone could determine the validity of constitutional amendments.
2.

The Guarantee Clause

Article IV provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every state in this union a republican form of government.”127 For
over a century, jurists and scholars have described the Guarantee
Clause as a nonjusticiable political question, such that Congress has
exclusive control over the meaning of that Clause.128 But as some
modern commentators have recognized, that was not the assumption
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.129
122 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793); see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An
“Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1271
(1998) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment overturned the ‘state suability’ determination in
Chisholm.”).
123 See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
393, 449 (1996) (“[Hollingsworth] nowhere intimated that the amendment process raised
political issues outside the judiciary’s competence.”).
124 See Dellinger, supra note 118, at 403 (noting that, after Hollingsworth in 1798, “[i]t
was not until the 1920’s that the Court was again called upon” to rule on the validity of
amendments).
125 See U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XIX. For substantive challenges, see National
Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (upholding the Eighteenth Amendment); infra
note 126 and accompanying text. For procedural challenges, see United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931) (rejecting an argument that the Eighteenth Amendment could
only be approved by a state convention); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375–76 (1921)
(upholding Congress’s seven-year time limit for ratifying the Eighteenth Amendment);
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 224–25, 227, 231 (1920) (holding that Ohio could not require
ratification by a voter referendum).
126 258 U.S. 130, 135–37 (1922) (noting that the change required by the Nineteenth
Amendment was no greater than that demanded by the Fifteenth Amendment).
127 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
128 See Brown, supra note 3, at 150 (“Every law student knows that a claim under the
so-called Guarantee Clause is a political question . . . .”).
129 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) (“In a group of cases
decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability,
the Court addressed the merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause . . . .”); Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist
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In Minor v. Happersett, for example, the Court held on the merits
that the denial of women’s suffrage did not violate the Guarantee
Clause, emphasizing that only one of the original thirteen states (and
no state admitted since) had granted women the right to vote.130 The
Court found that this history provided “unmistakable evidence” that
women’s suffrage was not a prerequisite of “republican” government
under the Constitution.131 The Court later adjudicated other
Guarantee Clause challenges to state government action, without any
suggestion that this constitutional issue might be a political
question.132
Coyle v. Smith is especially illuminating. The State of Oklahoma
sought by statute to move its state capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma
City.133 William H. Coyle, whose business interests would be
adversely affected by the move, challenged the state law on the
ground that it conflicted with the 1906 federal statute admitting
Oklahoma into the Union, which prohibited Oklahoma from moving
its capital until at least 1913.134 The central issue in the case was
whether Congress had the power to impose such a condition on a
state.135
Relying on Luther v. Borden, the plaintiff claimed that once
Congress determined, exercising its powers under the Admissions and
Guarantee Clauses, that “the temporary location of the capital should
be at Guthrie . . . the determination of congress must of necessity be
“Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1194–95 (2002) (“The [Luther]
Court did not hold that all complaints under the Guarantee Clause raised political
questions.”). One precedent is ambiguous on this score. See Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S.
548, 578–81 (1900) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Kentucky election contest either
on the merits or as nonjusticiable). Compare, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 3, at 920 & n.126
(citing Taylor as a case decided on the merits), with Scharpf, supra note 106, at 591 & n.255
(describing Taylor as a political question case).
130 See 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165, 175–78 (1875) (rejecting a challenge to provisions of
the Missouri constitution and laws that limited suffrage to “[e]very male citizen”).
According to the Court, New Jersey was the only state at the Founding that granted
women the right to vote, and the state dispensed with that right in 1807. Id. at 175–78.
131 See id. (concluding that this history provided “unmistakable evidence of what was
republican in form, within the meaning of that term as employed in the Constitution”).
132 See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Mich. v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 237–38, 239 (1905) (rejecting a
claim that the creation of a school district violated either the Contracts Clause or the
Guarantee Clause); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 515–16, 519 (1897) (rejecting a
claim that a state violates the Guarantee Clause by delegating to the state judiciary the
power to decide questions of annexation by a city).
133 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 562–63 (1911).
134 Id. at 563 (noting that the plaintiff was the “owner of large property interests in
Guthrie”).
135 Id. at 565 (stating that the issue was “whether the provision of the [admissions] act
was a valid limitation . . . , which overrides any subsequent state legislation repugnant
thereto”).
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binding upon the courts.”136 “[T]he courts may not question the constitutionality [of the federal law] but can only accept and give effect to
that which congress has created.”137 The plaintiff thereby sought, in
the spirit of the dicta in Luther, to extend the traditional political
question doctrine to a constitutional question. He urged the Court to
“give effect” not only to Congress’s judgment that the state capital
should be at Guthrie but also to Congress’s (implicit) determination
that it had the power to impose such a condition.
The Supreme Court did not, however, even entertain the argument that it was required to “give effect” to Congress’s judgment on a
constitutional question. Although the Court mentioned Coyle’s “political question” argument in describing the background of the case,138
the Court did not address the claim. Instead, the Court went directly
to the merits, holding that Congress could not restrict Oklahoma’s
authority to determine the location of its capital.139 The Court emphasized that Congress must admit states “upon an equal footing” with
existing states140 and declared that the Guarantee Clause did not
empower Congress “to impose restrictions upon a new State which
deprive it of equality with other members of the Union . . . .”141
136 Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error at 14–15, 53–54, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559 (1911) (No. 941).
137 Id. at 14–15; see also id. at 18 (“[T]he courts may not question the constitutionality
or power of congress but can only accept and give effect to that which congress has
created.”).
138 See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 565–66 (noting Coyle’s claim that “the power of Congress to
admit new states, and to determine whether or not its fundamental law is republican in
form, are political powers, and as such, uncontrollable by the courts”).
139 Id. at 573–74, 579–80.
140 Id. at 565–68, 573, 579–80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141 Id. at 567–68. Scholars have also suggested that the legislative process presents a
“political question,” such that Congress has final authority to determine whether it
complied with the Article I procedures for enacting legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7
(describing procedures for enacting legislation); Brown, supra note 3, at 151
(“Traditionally, the integrity of the means of reaching legislative decisions had been
considered off limits to judicial review for reasons focal to the political-question
doctrine.”); Choper, supra note 7, at 1505–06 (“Legislative enactments alleged as violating
constitutionally required procedures have been generally held to be political questions.”).
The Supreme Court has, in general, clearly not treated the legislative process as a political
question. For example, the Court has long adjudicated on the merits the constitutional
requirement that appropriations laws commence in the House of Representatives, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (describing constitutionally required procedures for appropriations
legislation); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 435–37 (1906) (deciding the constitutionality
of a revenue measure originating in the Senate); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196,
202–03 (1897) (deciding the constitutionality of a provision of a revenue bill that originated
in the Senate); see also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389–400 (1990)
(rejecting a claim that the Origination Clause presented a political question), and the scope
of the President’s pocket veto power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (describing the veto
powers); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 675, 682–83 (1929) (interpreting the pocket
veto provisions).
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D. The Traditional Doctrine and Judicial Review
Under the traditional political question doctrine, courts treated as
conclusive certain factual determinations made by the political
branches. However, aside from dicta in Luther v. Borden, the
Supreme Court showed little interest in extending this traditional doctrine to constitutional questions. That should be unsurprising.
Applying the traditional doctrine to a constitutional claim—that is,
treating the political branches’ determination of a constitutional question as a “rule of decision” for a case—would have been in serious
tension with nineteenth-century conceptions of judicial review.
In making the case for judicial review in Marbury, Chief Justice
Marshall considered in part whether the Court had to enforce a
statute, even if the Court found it unconstitutional.142 The issue, stated
another way, was whether the Court had to accept as conclusive
Nevertheless, commentators have pointed to Field v. Clark, which held that the
“enrolled act” certified by Congress and the executive is “unimpeachable” evidence of the
statute passed by Congress. 143 U.S. 649, 672–73 (1892). Scholars have suggested that Field
declared aspects of the Article I legislative process to be outside the scope of judicial
review. An examination of Field reveals, however, that the Court was instead simply
creating a rule of evidence. In the late nineteenth century, both federal and state courts
were struggling with the question whether the enrolled act or the journals of the legislative
chambers were superior evidence of “the law” enacted by the legislature. See Recent Case,
Impeachment of Statutes, 7 HARV. L. REV. 183, 186 (1893) (“Held, the fact that a bill has
been signed by . . . the general assembly, approved by the governor, and duly deposited . . .
shows . . . that it has become a law, and it is not competent to impeach the same by the
journals . . . or other evidence.”). Neither approach was ideal; legislators could falsify
either the enrolled act or the journals. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1350, at 1634, 1654 (1st ed. 1904)
(“[T]here is equal or greater danger of error and fraud in the journals . . . .”). For that
reason, a number of commentators, including Dean Wigmore in his 1904 Treatise on
Evidence, argued that courts should adopt the more efficient approach of looking only at
the enrolled act. Id. at 1654–55; see Dodd, supra note 94, at 67–68 (“A definite and more
easily applicable rule is established if the enrolled bill be treated as conclusive.”).
This debate reached the Supreme Court in Field. The plaintiffs in Field challenged a
tariff law in part on the ground that it omitted a provision that had been approved by both
chambers of Congress. 143 U.S. at 662–66, 668–69. Although the Court did not doubt that
Congress must comply with the procedures for enacting legislation, this “general principle
. . . [did] not determine the precise question before the court; for it remain[ed] to inquire as
to the nature of the evidence upon which a court may act” in determining “whether a bill
. . . was or was not passed by congress.” Id. at 669–70 (emphasis added). The Court
rejected the challengers’ claim that the “journal [of each House is] the best . . . evidence . . .
as to whether a bill was, in fact, passed” and held that it would instead treat the enrolled
act as “complete and unimpeachable” evidence of “the law” enacted by Congress. Id. at
670–71, 672–73. The Court later confirmed that Field created a rule of evidence, for the
Court invited Congress to modify its evidentiary rule by “declaring under what
circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of congress” may be impeached
and “shown not to be” the “true law” passed by Congress. Harwood v. Wentworth, 162
U.S. 547, 560 (1896); Twin City Bank, 167 U.S. at 201–02.
142 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-6\NYU602.txt

1936

unknown

Seq: 29

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2-DEC-15

11:58

[Vol. 90:1908

Congress’s (apparent) determination that its statute was valid: “If an
act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give
it effect?”143
The Chief Justice declared that such a proposition was “an
absurdity too gross to be insisted on.”144 He explained: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is . . . . So if a law be in opposition to the constitution . . . the court
must determine which of these conflicting [legal] rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”145 Decades later, the
Court reaffirmed that Congress could not require it to enforce what
the Court viewed as an unconstitutional law. The Court would not
treat the political branches’ determination of a constitutional question
as a “rule of decision” for a case.146
The Court’s declaration that it is the “province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is” has been understood by
some modern jurists and scholars as support for judicial supremacy.147
But, as other commentators have pointed out, the Court in Marbury
did not clearly assert that its constitutional rulings were “supreme”
143

Id. at 177.
Id.
145 Id. at 177–78.
146 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–48 (1872) (refusing to give
effect to a statute that imposed a “rule of decision” that the Court viewed as an
unconstitutional infringement on the President’s pardon power). Klein involved a statute
passed by Congress in 1870 to prevent former Confederates, who had received a
presidential pardon, from recovering property that was taken by the federal government
during the Civil War. See 16 Stat. 230, 235 (1870) (providing that “no pardon or amnesty
granted by the President . . . shall be admissible in evidence on the part of any claimant in
the court of claims as evidence in support of any claim against the United States”).
Although the Court’s reasoning is rather opaque, it appears that the Court struck down the
statute in large part because it required the courts to enforce an unconstitutional law. See
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145–48 (finding that the statute prescribed a rule that infringed
“the constitutional power of the Executive”); see also Martin H. Redish & Christopher R.
Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process:
Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 444
(2006); Tyler, supra note 115, at 393–99 (asserting that both Klein and Marbury require
courts to independently resolve constitutional questions).
147 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that Marbury “declared
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution”); see also Thomas Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic
Education, and the Stories We Tell Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 960 (2009) (“The
foundation of judicial supremacy is often traced back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s bold
declaration in Marbury v. Madison that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.’” (quoting 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)));
Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication,
77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1825 (1989) (noting invocations of Marbury’s “classic assertion of
judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the law”).
144
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and binding on government actors in all contexts; such claims of judicial supremacy would not become commonplace until the latter half of
the twentieth century.148 Instead, these commentators argue, the
Marbury Court indicated that it would decide constitutional questions
only to resolve a given case or controversy.149
Whatever the resolution of that debate, the important point for
present purposes is that the Court in Marbury and subsequent cases
firmly declared its independence in resolving any constitutional question that came before it.150 This independence with respect to constitutional questions contrasts sharply with the courts’ subservience
under the traditional political question doctrine, where the judiciary
enforced the political branches’ factual determinations, whether they
“be right or wrong.”151 As Chief Justice Marshall declared in
Marbury, the judiciary would not likewise enforce what it viewed as
an unconstitutional statute. The courts would not “close their eyes on
the constitution, and see only the law [enacted by Congress].”152
The historical account provided in this Article also sheds light on
another aspect of Marbury. Scholars have often described Marbury as
the source of the modern political question doctrine, stating that
“Marbury itself contains the seeds for the view that the authority to
answer some constitutional questions rests entirely with the political
branches,” because “[i]n Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall acknowl148

See infra notes 261–62, 305 and accompanying text.
See David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” Concept of Judicial Review, 42
DUKE L.J. 279, 326 (1992) (arguing that Marshall’s point in Marbury was “that the
judiciary’s determination of constitutional questions is limited both in opportunity and in
authoritative impact to a particular ‘case’”). Under this view, the Court’s power to make
constitutional pronouncements is simply a byproduct of its “dispute resolution” function.
For an illuminating discussion of the Court’s “law declaration” and “dispute resolution”
functions (and how both can be traced to Marbury), see Henry Paul Monaghan, On
Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665,
666–75 (2012). Notably, even some advocates of judicial supremacy have recognized that
Marbury is “ambiguous” on the question whether the judiciary must be the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Who Should Be the
Authoritative Interpreter of the Constitution? Why There Should Not Be a Political Question
Doctrine, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 2, at 181, 185 (noting that Marbury can be interpreted as not
resolving the question of whether there is an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution).
150 Notably, I use the term “independent” to underscore that the judiciary was not
bound to treat as conclusive the political branches’ constitutional determinations. I do not
mean to suggest that the courts owed no deference to other branches. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12–13, 34 (1983)
(arguing that the Court retains “independent” judgment, but that its decisions often reflect
the input of other units of government).
151 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
152 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
149
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edged the existence of certain questions that are wholly outside the
purview of the courts—‘[q]uestions, in their nature political.’ ”153
It would be surprising if Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury had
anticipated the modern political question doctrine—pursuant to which
courts treat certain constitutional claims as nonjusticiable because
they are “textually committed” to another branch. As discussed, there
is simply no evidence that such a doctrine existed in the nineteenth
century; on the contrary, courts during that era regularly adjudicated
constitutional questions that came before them in a case or controversy, including issues that are today considered “political questions.”
In context, however, it is clear that Chief Justice Marshall was not
declaring that certain constitutional questions were outside the scope
of judicial review. Marbury arose out of Secretary of State James
Madison’s refusal to deliver a commission to William Marbury, who
had been appointed by outgoing President John Adams to serve as a
justice of the peace in Washington, D.C.154 Marbury sued for a writ of
mandamus directing Madison to deliver the commission.155 Chief
Justice Marshall announced that the Court could issue the writ only if
Madison’s duty was “ministerial” rather than “discretionary.”156 It
was in this context—before the Chief Justice even mentioned judicial
review—that he made the comment about “questions, in their nature
political”:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.157

Thus, if Madison had discretion to either deliver or refuse to
deliver the commission, there would be nothing for the Court to
“mandate” via a writ of mandamus.158 The decision to deliver the
commission would be a question, in its nature political, submitted to
the executive. In that event, Madison’s conduct would be, on the
merits, within the bounds of his lawful discretion.159 The Court in
153

Barkow, supra note 3, at 239; see also supra note 4 (collecting sources).
See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 153–54.
155 See id. (discussing the background of the case).
156 See id. at 169–71 (explaining that the Court’s “duty of giving judgment” is limited to,
inter alia, the officer’s acts “directed by law,” as distinguished from acts left to “executive
discretion”).
157 Id. at 170.
158 See id. at 169 (“[T]o render the mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is
to be directed, must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may be directed . . . .”).
159 The modern-day equivalent would likely be the administrative law principle that
courts may not review actions that are “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C.
154
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Marbury, however, found that Madison did have a ministerial duty to
deliver the commission.160
Marbury did not lay the foundation for a political question doctrine precluding review of constitutional claims. In the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, there was only one political question doctrine: the traditional doctrine that required federal and state courts to
treat as conclusive certain factual determinations of the political
branches. This doctrine neither arose from Article III, nor was a hardand-fast jurisdictional rule; courts assumed, for example, that
Congress could transform some political questions into judicial questions by assigning those issues to the judiciary. It remains to be seen
how this traditional doctrine was eventually overtaken by the modern
doctrine of today.

THE (LACK

OF)

II
CLEAR CHANGE
DOCTRINE

IN

SUPREME COURT

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court continued to apply the traditional political question doctrine,
treating as conclusive the political branches’ determinations on certain
factual issues.161 In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., for example, the
defendant’s title to a piece of property depended on whether the
property had been confiscated by the “government” of Mexico or ille§ 701(a)(2) (2012); see Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482
U.S. 270, 282 (1987) (noting that judicial review is unavailable “to the extent that . . .
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(2012))).
160 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 158.
161 See, e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380–81, 390 (1948) (applying
the executive’s determination that Great Britain controlled Bermuda, and holding that the
Fair Labor Standards Act still applied to American workers at a military base there); Clark
v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947) (applying the political branches’ determination that a
treaty continued to exist with post-World War II occupied Germany in resolving a dispute
over a will); Cordova v. Grant, 248 U.S. 413, 419 (1919) (treating as conclusive the political
branches’ assertion of “authority over [a] territory” around the Rio Grande and
“follow[ing] its lead” in resolving a trespass action); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,
457–69, 476 (1913) (treating as conclusive the political branches’ determination that they
continued to have an extradition treaty with Italy, despite that country’s alleged breaches
of the treaty, and rejecting a habeas petitioner’s other challenges to his extradition to
Italy). The formal doctrine does not appear to have changed during this period, although
there was a noticeable change in the rhetoric of some decisions in which the Court
indicated less willingness simply to abide by political branch decisions, whether they were
right or wrong. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46–47 (1913) (stating that,
although “it is the rule of this court to follow” the political branches on the tribal status of
a group of Indians, Congress could not “arbitrarily call[ ] [a group] an Indian tribe”
(quoting United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1866))).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-6\NYU602.txt

1940

unknown

Seq: 33

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2-DEC-15

11:58

[Vol. 90:1908

gally taken by a rogue military regime.162 The Court declared, in
accordance with its precedents, that the question as to which regime
controlled Mexico was a political question, “the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments . . . conclusively
binds the judges.”163
The Supreme Court did, however, depart from its precedents in
1912, holding for the first time that it lacked jurisdiction to decide a
Guarantee Clause claim, because that constitutional issue was a
“political question.” But, importantly, the Court did not thereby
create a new doctrine of nonjusticiable political questions extending
beyond the Guarantee Clause. Only a plurality of the Court in 1939
and 1947 sought to extend that concept to other constitutional claims.
Accordingly, through the first half of the twentieth century, the
only “political question doctrine” accepted and applied by the Court
as a whole was the traditional doctrine. I nevertheless describe the
1912 and plurality decisions in some detail here, because (as discussed
in Part III) scholars would later emphasize those decisions in offering
a different conception of the “political question doctrine.”
A.

Pacific States: A New Paradigm

One year after Coyle, 164 the Supreme Court took a sharp turn on
Guarantee Clause claims in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Oregon. Pacific States asserted that an Oregon tax on corporations
violated the Guarantee Clause, because the law was adopted by a
popular initiative, rather than by the state legislature.165 The company
argued that “the vital element in a republican form of government . . .
is representation. Legislation by the people directly is the very
opposite.”166
In its Supreme Court briefs, Oregon invoked Luther v. Borden
and (erroneously characterizing its dicta as a holding) contended that
162 246 U.S. 297, 299 (1918). The case arose in the midst of the Mexican Revolution of
1910, during which two military officials—General Huerta and General Carranza—battled
for power. Id. at 299–300. The Carranza forces had confiscated the property at issue and
sold it to a company that, in turn, sold it to the defendant. Id. at 299–301.
163 Id. at 302 (quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)). By the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, the political branches recognized the Carranza regime as
the government of Mexico. Id. The Court found that, under international law principles,
the conduct of such a recognized government could not “be successfully questioned in the
courts of another” nation. Id. at 302–04. Accordingly, the defendant could keep the
property. Id. at 304.
164 221 U.S. 559, 565–68, 573–74, 579–80 (1911) (holding that Congress could not restrict
a state’s authority to move its capital); see supra Part I.C.2.
165 See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 103, 75–115, Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118 (1912) (No. 822).
166 Id. at 103.
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“the determination of political questions,” such as the “fact of the
very existence of a republican form of government, rests with the
Congress and with the Executive.”167 Oregon pointed out that “since
the adoption of [its] initiative and referendum” in 1902, Congress had
repeatedly accepted the state’s senators and representatives, “something which could not have taken place under [Luther v. Borden] if
Congress had failed to recognize the republican character of the constitution of the State.”168 Accordingly, “the very question . . . raised
by” Pacific States had been “finally and absolutely determined so far
as the judiciary is concerned.”169
Pacific States strongly disputed that the political branches’ determination of the “republican” nature of Oregon’s government was
“binding upon this court.”170 Pacific States declared: “[J]ust as this
court [in Coyle] declined to be bound by” Congress’s determination
that its admissions law “conformed to the Federal Constitution . . . so
here we invoke the court’s jurisdiction to review the validity of provisions” of the Oregon Constitution, even if the political branches
“have, by implication, accepted [Oregon’s initiative] as conforming to
the Federal Constitution.”171
The parties’ arguments thus seemed, much like Coyle, to present
the Court with two basic options. The Court could either independently decide the constitutional claim or treat as conclusive the political branches’ determination that the initiative complied with the
Guarantee Clause. But the Court did neither. Instead, the Pacific
States Court held that “the enforcement of [the Guarantee Clause],
because of its political character, is exclusively committed to
167 Supplemental Brief for Defendant in Error at 57–58, Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (No. 36); see also Brief of Defendant in Error at 5–6, Pac.
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (No. 822) (“The power to determine
whether a State has a republican form of government is vested in Congress. . . . [It] is a
political rather than a judicial question.”).
168 Supplemental Brief for Defendant in Error, supra note 167, at 60–61.
169 See id. at 57–58 (arguing that Pacific States’ “appeal lies to Congress or to the
Executive”). Interestingly, although Oregon quoted the language from Luther, urging the
courts to treat the political branches’ determination as conclusive, Oregon asked the Court
to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 63. Oregon may have asked for this
disposition in part because it claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction for other reasons—
that Pacific States lacked standing (or a cause of action) under the Guarantee Clause, and
that a state’s determination on how to allocate “legislative powers” did not raise a federal
question. See id. at 53–57. In any event, Oregon’s “political question” argument appeared
to be—and was apparently understood by Pacific States as—an argument that the Court
must treat as conclusive the determination of the political branches. Accordingly, Oregon
should have urged the Court to reject Pacific States’ claim on the merits.
170 Reply Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 21–28, Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118 (1912) (No. 822).
171 Id. at 26.
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Congress.”172 Indeed, without citation to cases like Coyle or Minor v.
Happersett, the Court asserted that this principle had “never been
doubted or questioned since” Luther v. Borden. 173 Accordingly, the
Court dismissed Pacific States’ constitutional claim “for want of jurisdiction.” 174
Some early twentieth-century commentators noticed that Pacific
States was a departure from the traditional political question doctrine.175 One observer stated in 1912:
The case is significant in that the court declined jurisdiction. The
mere fact that a political question was involved will not explain this
ruling. A political question is a question of fact which may arise in
any kind of case and has no bearing on the jurisdiction of the court.
The rule is merely that, instead of examining such a question on its
merits or submitting it to a jury, the court will, if possible, find out
how the political departments of government have decided it, and
will then follow that decision. . . . Many cases involving political
questions have been decided by the Supreme Court.176

Writing in 1925, Melvin Fuller Weston also found “a little difficulty . . . in reconciling” Pacific States with other “political question”
cases, where the courts “accept[ed] . . . the decision of the other
branches of government” as controlling on a particular issue.177
It is not clear why the Court in Pacific States departed from prior
law. The Court’s analysis is baffling. Much of the opinion suggests that
the case required it to rule on the validity of the entire Oregon government and “every . . . statute passed in Oregon since the adoption of
the initiative and referendum.”178 Such assertions were clearly over172

223 U.S. 118, 133, 136–37 (1912).
Id. at 148–49.
174 Id. at 151; see also id. (“As the issues presented . . . are, and have long . . . been,
definitely determined to be political and governmental, and embraced within the scope of
the powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of judicial power,
it follows that the case presented is not within our jurisdiction . . . .”).
175 See infra notes 176–77 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in Pacific States);
see also EDWIN COUNTRYMAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A
REVIEW OF CERTAIN DECISIONS RELATING TO ITS APPELLATE POWER UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION 253–55 (Matthew Bender & Co. eds., 1913) (arguing that the Court’s ruling
was not compelled by precedent).
176 Note, Initiative and Referendum, 25 HARV. L. REV. 644, 644 (1912).
177 Melville Fuller Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296, 327 (1925).
Weston, however, sought to explain the case as one where the plaintiff improperly asserted
a broad structural claim—an analysis that we might today describe as an assertion that the
plaintiff lacked standing or a cause of action under the Guarantee Clause. See id. at 322–26
(noting that the plaintiff claimed a “constitutional right . . . not to person or property . . .
but to political existence and integrity”).
178 Pac. States, 223 U.S. at 141 (stating that the plaintiff’s “propositions . . . proceed
alone upon the theory that the adoption of the initiative and referendum destroyed all
government republican in form in Oregon”); see also id. at 150–51 (“[T]he assault which
173
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stated.179 After all, as Pacific States itself emphasized, the Court was
“not asked to declare [Oregon] not to be a State” but “merely [to] . . .
pronounce” that a single provision of the state constitution “violates
one or more provisions of the Federal Constitution.”180
Walter Pratt has suggested that the Court in Pacific States was
concerned about a potential political backlash against a decision invalidating the initiative, which was a key part of the progressive agenda
in the early twentieth century.181 By 1912, many progressives were
highly critical of what they perceived as a probusiness federal judiciary; a decision invalidating a state initiative imposing a tax on corporations could have added fuel to that fire.182
Whatever the explanation for the decision, the Court in Pacific
States did not purport to create a new doctrine of nonjusticiable constitutional questions. On the contrary, the Court claimed—however
erroneously—to be applying principles that had “never been doubted
or questioned since” Luther v. Borden.183 The impact of the 1912 decision, if any, would thus be determined by subsequent developments.
B.

The Splintered Opinions in Coleman and Colegrove

For two decades after Pacific States, the Court reaffirmed
(without analysis) that “questions arising under [the Guarantee
Clause] are political, not judicial, in character . . . .”184 But the Court
the contention here advanced makes is not on the tax as a tax, but on the State as a
State.”).
179 Scholars both at the time of Pacific States and more recently have noted that the
Court’s assertions were far-fetched. See COUNTRYMAN, supra note 175, at 259–61
(describing the Court’s characterization of the case as “unreal” and “illusory”); Richard L.
Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfilled: An Argument for the
Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause Cases, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 2, at 75, 81
(arguing that the Court’s “‘parade of horribles’” argument was “surely makeweight”).
180 Reply Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 170, at 25.
181 See WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS
WHITE, 1910–1921, at 69–71 (1999) (discussing the Court’s decision); Nathaniel A. Persily,
The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 13 (1997) (observing that
the initiative, referendum, and recall were “emblematic” progressive reforms).
182 See PRATT, supra note 181, at 70–71 (asserting that Pacific States “could not have
come at a more opportune time to blunt the attacks on the courts”). For a discussion of the
court-curbing efforts by progressives and populists during this era, see Tara Leigh Grove,
The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890–99 (2011).
183 Pac. States, 223 U.S. at 148–49.
184 Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79–80 (1930); see
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234–35 (1917); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239
U.S. 244, 248 (1915) (“The attempt to invoke § 4 of article 4 of the Federal Constitution is
obviously futile . . . .” (citing Pac. States, 223 U.S. 118)). However, in one case, the Court
seemed to reject the Guarantee Clause claim on the merits—before noting that it was
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did not go on to declare other constitutional claims to be nonjusticiable political questions. The Court, for example, through 1931 continued to adjudicate on the merits challenges to constitutional
amendments.185
Then, in a deeply divided opinion in Coleman v. Miller, the
Justices for the first time declined to rule on the validity of an amendment—a proposal on child labor.186 A group of Kansas legislators
brought the suit, alleging that the amendment had not been properly
ratified by their state.187 Writing for a three-Justice plurality, Chief
Justice Hughes asserted that the case presented nonjusticiable political questions that Congress had the “ultimate authority” to decide.188
Four other Justices, however, advocated a very different
approach. Writing for that group,189 Justice Black argued for the
extension of the traditional political question doctrine to this area of
constitutional law. Relying on cases like Williams v. Suffolk Insurance
nonjusticiable. See Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (stating
that the unlawful delegation of state legislative power was “not a denial of a republican
form of government” and that “[e]ven if it were, the enforcement of that guarantee . . . is
for Congress, not the courts”).
185 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the adjudication).
186 The Child Labor Amendment was proposed in 1924 to overrule Supreme Court
decisions holding that Congress lacked the power to prohibit child labor in the states. See
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 & n.1 (1939) (noting the date of proposal); DAVID E.
KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995,
at 257, 307–09, 469 (1996) (discussing the amendment); see also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36–38, 44 (1922) (holding that Congress could not use its taxing power to
regulate child labor); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272–73 (1918) (holding that
Congress could not use its commerce power to regulate child labor). The amendment was
rendered unnecessary in 1941 when the Court upheld Congress’s power to regulate labor
conditions. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115–17 (1941) (upholding
congressional regulation of labor conditions); KYVIG, supra, at 313 (observing that, after
Darby, “any remaining feeling of need for the still-unratified [child labor] amendment
evaporated”).
187 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436–37 (discussing the suit).
188 See id. at 450–51 (concluding that Congress had “ultimate authority” to determine
“the efficacy of ratifications” and “whether . . . [an] amendment had lost its vitality through
lapse of time . . . .”). Admittedly, the “political question” analysis in Chief Justice Hughes’s
plurality opinion is somewhat ambiguous. Most notably, the plurality “affirmed” the state
court’s decision rejecting the state legislators’ lawsuit, rather than dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction (as one might expect from a finding of “nonjusticiability”). Id. at 456.
So it is plausible to say that even the plurality did not seek to extend the approach of
Pacific States—a position that would further strengthen my contention that there was no
doctrine of “nonjusticiable” political questions outside the context of the Guarantee
Clause. Much of the plurality’s opinion, however, sounds like an effort to extend Pacific
States. So for present purposes, I assume that was the goal of Chief Justice Hughes’s
opinion. I seek here to show that, even if one makes this assumption, there was still no
majority support in Coleman for expanding the Pacific States approach beyond the
Guarantee Clause.
189 Justice Black believed the legislators lacked standing but still discussed justiciability
because a majority of the Court found standing. Id. at 456–57 (Black, J., concurring).
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Co., Justice Black insisted that Congress’s determination that an
amendment “conforms to the commands of the Constitution” “‘conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and
subjects of . . . government.’”190 Moreover, Justice Black emphasized
(along the lines of the traditional doctrine) that both federal and state
courts were bound by Congress’s determination of this “political question.” For that reason, he chastised the Kansas Supreme Court for
“assum[ing] jurisdiction” to review the amendment process.191
“Neither State nor Federal courts can review that power.”192
It is not clear why seven Justices declined to decide Coleman on
the merits, particularly given that the Court had ruled on similar challenges as recently as 1931. But whatever the reason for the Justices’
votes,193 the fractured opinions in Coleman provided little insight into
how a “political question doctrine” might apply, if at all, to constitutional questions. Although three Justices indicated (along the lines of
Pacific States) that the validity of a constitutional amendment was a
nonjusticiable political question, four other Justices insisted (in tension with the principles of Marbury) that the Court was bound to treat
Congress’s constitutional determination as a “rule of decision” in

190 Id. at 457–58 (“[D]ecision of a ‘political question’ by the ‘political department’ to
which the Constitution has committed it ‘conclusively binds the judges’” (quoting Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890))); see id. at 457 & n.3 (“‘[I]t is not material to
inquire, nor is it the province of the court to determine, whether the executive (‘political
department’) be right or wrong. It is enough to know that in the exercise of his
constitutional functions, he has decided the question.’” (quoting Williams v. Suffolk Ins.
Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839))).
191 Id. at 458.
192 Id. at 459.
193 One possible explanation is that the Justices in Coleman were concerned about
potential challenges to the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Hughes’s plurality
alluded to the “special circumstances” under which that amendment was added to the
Constitution. Id. at 449–50. During Reconstruction, Congress instructed the southern
states that they could not rejoin the Union, unless they ratified the amendment. See
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,
1109 (1995). Scholars have thus debated whether the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted
in accordance with Article V. Compare, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 15–17, 21–23 (1998) (contending that the Fourteenth Amendment can
be justified only if the text of the Constitution may be altered outside the Article V
process), with John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 375, 378 (2001) (arguing that the amendment was valid under Article V). In
Coleman, a majority of the Court made clear that it would not entertain any such
challenge. See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text (discussing the ruling). I am
grateful to Walter Dellinger for making me aware of the possible connection between
Coleman and the Fourteenth Amendment.
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future cases. And the remaining two Justices in Coleman urged the
Court to decide the case on the merits.194
The Court’s next excursion into this terrain, Colegrove v. Green,
offered little clarity. Colegrove involved a challenge to an Illinois
statute governing the apportionment of congressional districts.195 The
plaintiffs alleged that the districts were severely malapportioned in
violation of, among other things, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.196
Writing for a three-Justice plurality, Justice Frankfurter found
that the plaintiffs’ claim was a nonjusticiable political question,
because the Constitution “conferred upon Congress exclusive
authority to secure fair representation by the States.”197 But Justice
Frankfurter’s effort to extend the approach of Pacific States commanded only two other votes. Justice Rutledge concurred separately
on the ground that, in his view, the Court should decline to exercise its
discretionary power to issue equitable relief.198 (That four-Justice
vote was sufficient to reject the plaintiffs’ challenge, because the case
was heard by a seven-member Court.199) Justice Black (joined by
Justices Douglas and Murphy) dissented, arguing that the case did not
present a nonjusticiable political question and that malapportionment
denied voters the equal protection of the laws.200 The divided opinions

194 Justices Butler and McReynolds asserted that the amendment was invalid because it
was not ratified within a reasonable time. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 470–74 (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
195 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550–51 (1946) (describing the claim).
196 See id. (describing the claim); see Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1958) (discussing the claim).
197 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554–55 (plurality opinion) (writing that the Constitution
“precludes judicial correction” of the alleged “evil[ ]” of malapportionment); see also id. at
554 (emphasizing that Article I empowers Congress to “make or alter” state regulations of
the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
Justice Frankfurter’s plurality opinion also suggested that the plaintiffs lacked standing,
because they asserted an injury to Illinois as a polity rather than a personal injury, and that
the Court lacked the power to order the equitable remedy sought by the plaintiffs. Id. at
552.
198 See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 565–66 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court
should not exercise its jurisdiction).
199 See Petition for Rehearing at 2, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550–51 (1946)
(No. 804) (“It is most unfortunate . . . that the case necessarily had to be decided by seven
Justices . . . .”); see also HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR
173 (1995) (noting that Justice Jackson “did not participate in the case” because he was “in
Europe serving as chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg tribunal” and “[t]here was no ninth
vote because Chief Justice Harlan Stone, recently deceased, had not yet been replaced”).
200 See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 569–73 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the issue was
justiciable and that the Court should have ruled in favor of the plaintiffs).
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in Coleman and Colegrove did not create a new “political question
doctrine” extending beyond the Guarantee Clause.201
III
THE ACADEMIC DEBATE: CHANGING UNDERSTANDINGS
OF THE “POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE”
From the early nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, the
Supreme Court applied the traditional political question doctrine,
treating as conclusive the political branches’ determinations on certain
factual issues in the course of deciding cases. Although the Court
beginning in 1912 also found Guarantee Clause claims to be nonjusticiable political questions, only a plurality of the Court sought to
extend that concept to other constitutional issues. Yet, by the midtwentieth century, much of the legal community considered Pacific
States and the plurality decisions in Coleman and Colegrove to be the
core of the “political question doctrine.” This shift in thinking is quite
puzzling. But I suggest here that this shift can be traced to significant
changes in the academic discourse about the doctrine.
A.

The Shifting Focus to Pacific States and Its Progeny

In the first few decades of the twentieth century, a number of
scholars struggled to make sense of the various “political question”
cases. Like scholars today, some of these early commentators sought
to explain why courts designated some issues as “political questions”
as opposed to “judicial questions.”202 But this early scholarship also
differed significantly from subsequent commentary on the political
question doctrine. First, these early scholars focused on traditional
201 Following Colegrove, the Supreme Court declined to intervene in a series of
reapportionment cases. But none of these decisions clearly turned on a finding of
nonjusticiability. In some cases, the Court’s opinion indicated that it would not provide the
equitable relief sought (as suggested by Justice Rutledge’s concurrence in Colegrove). See
South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950) (denying equitable relief). In the other cases, the
Court denied the appeal for want of a substantial federal question, see Remmey v. Smith,
342 U.S. 916, 916 (1952), or without providing any reason, see Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S.
920, 920 (1956); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675, 675 (1946).
202 Compare, e.g., Weston, supra note 177, at 300–01, 331–33 (arguing that “the line
between ‘judicial’ . . . on the one hand, and ‘political’ on the other, is wholly a matter of the
delegation of authority under organic law”), with Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial SelfLimitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 339, 344 (1924) (asserting that courts designated certain
issues as “political questions” for prudential reasons), and Field, supra note 76, at 485,
486–510, 511–13 (asserting that the designation of a matter as a “political question” rested
on several factors, such as “the separation of powers” and “a lack of legal principles to
apply”); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
traditional doctrine, constitutional considerations likely informed the designation of
“political questions”).
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political question cases, characterizing the “doctrine of political questions” as one that generally required the courts to treat “[t]he
expressed view of the political department” as “a rule of decision for
the court.”203 Although scholars sought, at times with some frustration,204 to incorporate the Guarantee Clause cases into their analyses,205 the political question doctrine was not seen primarily as a
mechanism for determining which constitutional claims would be subject to judicial review.206 Second, these early scholars did not treat the
political question doctrine as a matter of Article III jurisdiction;
instead, these commentators recognized that both federal and state
courts were required to apply the political branches’ decisions on
“political questions.”207
By the early 1930s, however (surprisingly, even before Coleman
in 1939), there were signs of a shift in the scholarly definition of a
203 Field, supra note 76, at 485; see also CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION § 51, at 128–29 (1922) (noting that the courts are controlled by
and “will . . . follow without question the decision of the political departments” on various
“political questions”); CHARLES GORDON POST, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND
POLITICAL QUESTIONS 11, 15 (1936) (stating that when the court is faced with a “political
question,” “it will disclaim all authority over the question and accept the decision of the
political departments” and thus “depend upon the political departments . . . to inform [the
court], by act or word, of the proper decision to apply in the particular case”); WRIGHT,
supra note 80, at 172–73 (“[I]f the controversy involves ‘a political question’ the courts
hold that they must follow the decision of the political organs . . . .”). Scholars also
continued to discuss, as “political question” cases, decisions involving the power of states
to assert their “political rights” in court, which we now describe as a matter of standing. See
supra note 30; see also BURDICK, supra, § 51, at 131–32 (describing the Court’s refusal, for
lack of jurisdiction, to entertain Georgia’s application for an injunction against
enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts).
204 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Weston’s comment
in 1925 that he had “a little difficulty” reconciling Pacific States with some other political
question cases).
205 See BURDICK, supra note 203, § 51, at 129–30 (describing the political question
doctrine as one in which “the courts will adopt the conclusions reached . . . by the political
departments” and noting that Luther was such a case, and asserting that “[a]cting upon the
same principle, the Supreme Court [in Pacific States] has refused to consider the question
whether a State has or has not a republican form of government”); POST, supra note 203, at
13–16, 19–20 (describing Luther, both as a case where the Court applied the political
branches’ determination as to the “de jure government of Rhode Island” and, like Pacific
States, as about the Court’s “competence concerning” the Guarantee Clause (footnote
omitted)).
206 The exception may be Maurice Finkelstein. He argued that the courts should steer
clear of certain (principally constitutional) issues, such as those entailed in the due process
cases of the Lochner era. Finkelstein, supra note 202, at 361–63.
207 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 36, § 56, at 100 (explaining that “if the [political]
question has been settled by the action of the political departments of the government, the
judiciary will accept and follow their conclusions without question”); Weston, supra note
177, at 315–16 (noting the “fairly well settled” principle that “questions involving
international relations” are considered political questions).
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“political question.”208 A few scholars began to describe “political
questions” as constitutional issues that were outside the scope of judicial review209 and to define the “political question doctrine” as an
Article III jurisdictional device. 210 The shift continued over the next
few decades. During this period, although scholars at times mentioned
that nonconstitutional issues—like the recognition of foreign governments or the status of Indian tribes—were “political questions,” there
was little discussion of how these traditional political questions
impacted a judicial decision. That is, scholars often overlooked the
fact that courts would treat the political branches’ determinations of
these issues as binding rules of decision in adjudicating cases.211
Scholars instead tended to describe all “political questions” as issues
that were simply “non-justiciable.”212
By the mid-twentieth century, the shift was largely complete.213
The paradigmatic “political question” cases were those in which the
208 The findings here are based on my chronological review of books and dozens of
articles on “political questions” from around the 1880s through the 1960s.
209 See, e.g., E.F. Albertsworth, Constitutional Duties and Inadequate Enforcement
Machinery, 17 A.B.A. J. 153, 153 (1931) (criticizing “judicial non-review of so-called
‘political’ questions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
210 The first such reference that I identified was a 1927 student note. See Note, What
Constitutes a Case or Controversy Within the Meaning of Article III of the Constitution, 41
HARV. L. REV. 232, 232–33 (1927) (“Collusive suits, moot cases, advisory functions and
political questions are all without the scope of the judicial power.” (footnotes omitted)).
Subsequent commentators increasingly treated the “political question doctrine” as a
matter of Article III jurisdiction. See, e.g., John J. Cauley, Note, Political Questions as
Distinguished from Judicial Questions, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231, 231 (1949)
(“Recognizing that certain matters are beyond the effective or permitted scope of the
judicial function, the Supreme Court has frequently refused to act in cases involving a
‘political question’ . . . .”).
211 See John P. Frank, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 36,
36–43 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (focusing on the nonjusticiability of political questions);
Note, Judicial Attitude Toward Political Question Doctrine: The Gerrymander and Civil
Rights, 1960 WASH. U. L.Q. 292, 293 (asserting that “non-justiciable . . . political
questions” include “such questions as: (1) recognition of foreign governments; (2)
commencement and termination of war; (3) jurisdiction over territory; [and] (4) status of
Indian tribes” and that “[o]nce there has been a determination that a case is substantially
concerned with a political question, the case will be dismissed and the decision of the
department of government involved will stand undisturbed” (footnotes omitted)).
212 Frank, supra note 211, at 36; see also id. at 36–43 (noting that courts had treated, as
political questions, not only Guarantee Clause and constitutional amendments issues, but
also questions like recognition of foreign governments, the beginning or end of war, status
of Indian tribes, and the enforcement of treaties, but failing to explain that in the latter set
of cases, the courts had treated the decision of the political department as a rule of decision
for the court); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1302 (1961) (characterizing “the category of ‘political question’”
as “a doctrine of judicial abstention”).
213 I identified only a few mid-twentieth-century articles that continued to discuss the
traditional doctrine. See, e.g., Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law:
“Political Questions,” 104 U. PA. L. REV. 451, 451 (1956) (explaining that in foreign affairs
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Supreme Court dismissed constitutional claims for lack of jurisdiction.214 According to scholars of this era, such nonjusticiable constitutional questions included not only the Guarantee Clause but also
constitutional amendments and reapportionment (despite the division
in Coleman and Colegrove).215 In short, scholars viewed the political
question doctrine much like commentators today—as a “limitation,
quite vague in outline, on the exercise by the courts of [the] function”
of judicial review.216
B. The “Political Question Doctrine” in Law School Texts
One sign of (and likely contributor to) the shift in the understanding of the political question doctrine was the coverage of the
doctrine in federal courts casebooks.217 In the first edition of his wellknown casebook, published in 1931, then-Professor Felix Frankfurter
(working with Wilber G. Katz) included a short portion on “political
cases, under “the so-called doctrine of ‘political questions,’” once the political branches
have made a decision “the courts are limited to ascertainment and conformity”).
214 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 28 (1960) (“There is
another limitation, quite vague in outline, on the exercise by the courts of [judicial review].
It is said that the courts may not decide ‘political’ questions.”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1959) (“[T]he courts
themselves regard some questions as ‘political,’ meaning thereby that they are not to be
resolved judicially, although they involve constitutional interpretation and arise in the
course of litigation.”).
215 See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15–16 (1958) (discussing as examples of
political questions state gerrymandering, the validity of federal constitutional amendments,
and “whether an amendment to a state constitution has made it no longer ‘Republican’”);
Willard Hurst, Review and the Distribution of National Powers, in SUPREME COURT AND
SUPREME LAW 140, 147–49 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (describing the political question
doctrine as a limit on judicial review and characterizing Luther as a case in which the Court
declared that “the question whether a state possesses a republican form of government . . .
is a matter for Congress to decide”); Wechsler, supra note 214, at 7–9 (providing, as
examples of “political questions,” constitutional issues arising out of impeachment, the
seating or expulsion of a senator or representative under Article I, the Guarantee Clause,
and state gerrymanders). Some scholars also treated Field v. Clark, a case about legislative
procedures, as a “political question” case. E.g., Hurst, supra, 148 & n.25; see also supra
note 141 (explaining that Field created a rule of evidence and did not declare aspects of the
legislative process to be outside the scope of judicial review).
216 BLACK, supra note 214, at 28; see also Hurst, supra note 215, at 144 (describing “the
vaguely defined area known as ‘political questions’” as “one of the earliest, and . . . most
persistent, aspects of judicial review”); Jaffe, supra note 212, at 1300 (stating that “the
doctrine of ‘political questions’” created a “vague[ ]” set of exceptions to judicial review).
217 See infra notes 218–24 and accompanying text. The first three federal courts
casebooks did not mention any doctrine of “political questions.” See HAROLD R. MEDINA,
CASES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1926); GEORGE W. RIGHTMIRE,
CASES AND READINGS ON THE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1917); CARL C. WHEATON, CASES ON FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1921); see generally Mary
Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism,” 27 GA. L. REV.
697, 758–60 (1993) (identifying the Medina, Rightmire, and Wheaton casebooks as the first
three texts for then-emerging courses on federal jurisdiction).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-6\NYU602.txt

unknown

Seq: 44

2-DEC-15

11:58

December 2015] LOST HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 1951

questions” in the chapter entitled “Constitutional Limits of the
Judicial Power—‘Case or Controversy.’ ”218 Frankfurter used, as the
only principal case, Pacific States.219 Although Frankfurter’s 1931
casebook cited a few articles that discuss traditional political question
cases,220 the casebook did not directly mention the traditional side of
the doctrine.
Subsequent casebooks followed suit—emphasizing Pacific States
and other constitutional cases, with little or no mention of the traditional doctrine.221 The first edition of Armisted Dobie’s federal courts
casebook, released in 1935, offers an illustration. In a section entitled
“Further Limitations on Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: Political
Questions,” Dobie used Pacific States as the first principal case.222 The
second (and only other) principal “political question” case was Nixon
v. Herndon, in which the Supreme Court struck down on equal protection grounds a Texas state law that prevented African Americans
218 FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE ix, 118–25, 763 (1931).
219 See FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 218, at 118–25 & 125 n.1.
220 Id. at 125 n.1 (citing Field, supra note 76, and Weston, supra note 177).
221 Several of the early casebooks focused on Pacific States or other constitutional cases.
See ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE & MASON LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE xii, 122–26 (1940) (containing a subsection for “Political
Questions” under “Further Limitations on Jurisdiction of Federal Courts,” and presenting
as principal cases Pacific States and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), where the
Court adjudicated on the merits a constitutional challenge to racial discrimination in
primary voting); ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, CASES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE vii, 71–74 (1935) (same); RAY FORRESTER, DOBIE AND LADD’S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE xiii, 83–88 (2d ed. 1950)
(containing a subsection for “Political Questions” under “Further Limitations on
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts,” and presenting as principal cases Coleman and Colegrove).
Other casebooks highlighted cases about the power of states to assert their “political
rights” in court (cases that are now described as standing cases), but also pointed readers
to Pacific States and other constitutional cases as the only other “political question” cases.
See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & JAMES H. CHADBOURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL COURTS 14–15, 17 n.7 (2d ed. 1950) (directing readers in the index to a
discussion about political questions in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), and
mentioning Pacific States in a footnote); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & JAMES H.
CHADBOURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 12–13, 15 n.5, 876 (1946)
(same); see also supra note 30 (noting that these “political rights” cases are now viewed as
standing decisions). Interestingly, Professor Frankfurter took the latter approach in the
second edition of his treatise. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & HARRY SHULMAN, CASES AND
OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 30–33 & n.1 (rev. ed.
1937) (using Georgia v. Stanton as the principal “political question” case, and discussing
Pacific States and Luther v. Borden). The casebooks all gave short shrift to (or made no
mention of) the traditional political question doctrine. Notably, no casebook suggested to
readers how “political questions” functioned in the traditional cases until the first edition
of HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). And, as discussed below, Hart and Wechsler still emphasized the
decisions involving constitutional claims. See infra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
222 DOBIE, supra note 221, at vii, 71–73.
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from voting in primary elections.223 The juxtaposition of these two
decisions is striking. In Pacific States, the Court held that Guarantee
Clause claims were committed to Congress, while the Court resolved
the equal protection challenge in Nixon v. Herndon. Accordingly, as
presented by Dobie in 1935 (notably, even before Coleman), the political question doctrine was very much what we perceive today: a doctrine that determines which constitutional questions may be resolved
by the judiciary, and which are reserved to the political branches.
The Dobie casebook did mention traditional political question
cases in a footnote, observing that “the executive, not the judicial,
department must pass on” matters such as “which foreign government
has jurisdiction over certain territory,”224 but nowhere explained the
very different way in which these traditional political questions operated in federal court decisions. Thus, the casebook did not alert
readers to the fact that the courts enforced and applied the executive’s
decision as to which country controlled a territory, rather than (as in
Pacific States) dismissing as nonjusticiable an issue that involved a
“political question.”
The first edition of Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System, published in 1953, offered a
similar, albeit somewhat more complete, picture. Much like the
casebook’s predecessors, Hart and Wechsler presented the political
question doctrine as a jurisdictional issue arising under Article III,
placing the section on “Political Questions” in a chapter entitled “The
Nature of the Federal Judicial Function: Cases and Controversies.”225
Hart and Wechsler also focused on constitutional claims. Thus, the
principal case for the section was Colegrove, and the first examples of
political question cases were Pacific States and Luther v. Borden.226
(The casebook inaccurately described the latter as a case about the
meaning of the Guarantee Clause, rather than solely as a dispute over

223 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); DOBIE, supra note 221, at 73–74. The state officials in
Nixon v. Herndon urged that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over suits involving
state primaries. See Brief for Texas at 5–6, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (No.
117). But the Court dismissed that objection as “little more than a play upon words.”
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540 (“That private damage may be caused by . . . political
action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two
hundred years . . . .”).
224 DOBIE, supra note 221, at 74 n.74.
225 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 221, at xviii–xx.
226 Id. at 192–93 (discussing Pacific States and Luther).
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which government controlled Rhode Island.227) Coleman was another
leading example of a “political question” case.228
Hart and Wechsler did also mention—in the text, not simply in
the footnotes—that the concept of “political questions” might encompass issues like the “[d]uration of a state of war” and “[r]ecognition of
foreign governments,” and in discussing Oetjen indicated that courts
would treat as “conclusive[ ]” the political branches’ decision as to
which government controlled a given territory.229 Accordingly, the
casebook at least pointed readers toward the traditional doctrine.
The bulk of Hart and Wechsler, however, presented the political
question doctrine much like the casebook’s predecessors—primarily
as a mechanism for declaring certain constitutional questions outside
the scope of judicial review. Indeed, Hart and Wechsler closed the
section on political questions with the following: “If you were revising
the Constitution of the United States, or framing an ideal constitution . . . , to what extent would you employ the courts to settle” basic
questions of “asserted governmental authority?”230 In other words,
the first edition of Hart and Wechsler invited readers to consider the
extent to which a legal system should employ judicial review.
Notably, these casebook selections not only reflected but also
likely contributed to the change in the understanding of the “political
question doctrine.” Frankfurter’s decision to highlight Pacific States in
1931 likely had a major impact on the subsequent scholarly literature
and casebook coverage of the political question doctrine. As Professor
and (later) Justice, Frankfurter was mentor and friend to many of the
leading federal courts scholars of the mid-twentieth century, including
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler. 231 Indeed, Professors Hart and
Wechsler dedicated the first edition of their casebook to
227 According to the casebook, the plaintiff argued that “the charter government was
invalid because in violation” of the Guarantee Clause. Id. at 192–93 (describing the claim
that “the rebel government . . . was in control” as a secondary argument). But see supra
note 108 and accompanying text (noting the plaintiffs in Luther did not make a Guarantee
Clause claim).
228 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 221, at 193–94. Hart and Wechsler also highlighted
Field v. Clark, a case that had come to be seen as declaring certain aspects of the legislative
process outside the scope of judicial review. See supra notes 141, 215. As I explain above,
Field was an evidentiary decision. See supra note 141.
229 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 221, § 6, at 194–95 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
230 Id. at 209.
231 See Amar, supra note 18, at 689 n.7, 699 n.52, 703 n.71; McManamon, supra note 217,
at 768–69 (noting that Hart and Wechsler were “student and collaborator” and “friend” of
Frankfurter, respectively, and that their book was “clearly a descendant of Frankfurter’s
casebook”).
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Frankfurter.232 That 1953 edition, in turn, soon became the “definitive
text on the subject of federal jurisdiction,” which “defin[ed] the pedagogic canon” of the field of federal courts for generations.233 The
influence of Frankfurter, Hart, and Wechsler, thus helps explain the
dramatic shift in the understanding of the political question doctrine:
The “definitive texts” of federal courts instructed the legal community
that the “political question doctrine” was an Article III jurisdictional
device that served primarily to identify which constitutional questions
could be adjudicated by the federal courts.
C.

Explaining the Shift in Scholarly Understanding

There remains the puzzle of why scholars, and particularly
casebook authors, would emphasize a “doctrine” that had not clearly
been adopted by the Supreme Court—or, at least, why no one seemed
to question the coverage of “political questions” in casebooks.
Although it may be impossible to fully explain this phenomenon, I
suggest that broader political and jurisprudential forces likely influenced the scholarly emphasis on a “political question doctrine” that
could define the scope of judicial review.234
In the early twentieth century, progressives were deeply critical
of what they viewed as a probusiness Supreme Court, which struck
down on constitutional grounds federal and state regulations designed
to protect workers.235 The Court’s constitutional decisions during this
“Lochner era” were closely associated with a way of thinking about
law—that law was a science, and that legal principles could be
“found” to answer any question.236 Around the same time, and partly
232 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 221, at ix (showing that the first edition was
dedicated “to Felix Frankfurter, who first opened our minds to these problems”).
233 Amar, supra note 18, at 689–90 (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 906, 907 (1954)).
234 I offer here only a brief account of the jurisprudential changes of this era. Cf.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 169
(1992) (“[D]efining Legal Realism with precision is not . . . easy”); Amar, supra note 18, at
691 (stating that the legal process school “resists a simple one-line encapsulation”).
235 See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 1, 179 (1994) (observing that from 1890 to
1937, “populists, progressives, and labor leaders subjected both state and federal courts to
vigorous and persistent criticism” and that “[p]rogressive proposals [during the 1920s]
more often involved only the Supreme Court”); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions
Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 959–62 (2013) (discussing
challenges to the Court’s constitutional decisions during this era).
236 See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY’S END 24 (1995) (“The conceptualism of this era was . . . associated with the
substantive due process tradition of constitutional law . . . .”). Indeed, in his dissent in
Lochner v. New York, Justice Holmes attacked both the political assumptions and the
conceptual approach of the majority opinion. See 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
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in reaction to the Court’s probusiness decisions,237 a group of scholars
known as “legal realists” urged a different understanding of law and
legal institutions. Legal realists insisted that law was not “found” but
“made”; much like political actors, judges had considerable discretion
in choosing how to rule in each case. 238 Accordingly, legal realists
called into question any attempt to “create a sharp distinction
between law and politics and to portray law as neutral, natural, and
apolitical.” 239
This new way of thinking about law had important implications
for debates over judicial review. If the job of a judge was much like
that of a legislator—with judges making choices, rather than identifying legal principles—judicial review became much more difficult to
justify.240 At a minimum, the legal realist critique seemed to counsel
in favor of judicial restraint; but it could call into question the very
existence of a judicial power to strike down legislation.
This intellectual dilemma provided the impetus for another
school of academic thought: legal process theory.241 In keeping with
the insights of legal realism, legal process scholars acknowledged that
judges had discretion when they made decisions, including in constitutional cases.242 But legal process scholars insisted that judicial discredissenting) (stating that “[t]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain” and that “[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete
cases”).
237 See MINDA, supra note 236, at 24–26 (“Some of the leading legal decisions
responsible for generating the American legal realist movement were the Supreme Court’s
economic due process decisions. The most notorious was Lochner v. New York.”); see also
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 17 (1996) (“Legal
realism proved the jurisprudential analogue of reform liberalism . . . .”).
238 See KALMAN, supra note 237, at 15–16 (“[T]he realists saw that for each legal rule
that led to one result, at least one more rule pointed to another result.”).
239 HORWITZ, supra note 234, at 170.
240 See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 618 & n.37 (1991) (observing
that, under the legal realist view, “judicial action resembles legislative decree . . . . [T]he
fear arises that they may decide cases according to their personal preferences without the
constraint imposed by accountability to the electorate” and that “[t]he problem is most
acute in the constitutional context, where legislatures cannot override judicial decisions”);
see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
919, 941 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988))
(“[L]egal realism challenged the very nature and scope of judicial power.”).
241 See HORWITZ, supra note 234, at 254–55 (“The legal process school sought to absorb
and temper the insights of Legal Realism after the triumph of the New Deal.”); Barry
Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503, 516–18 (1997)
(recounting how legal process theorists sought to respond to legal realists).
242 See HORWITZ, supra note 234, at 254 (describing the legal process school’s
“recognition that doctrinal formalism was incapable of eliminating discretion in the law”);
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tion could be properly confined through procedure.243 Reasoned
decisionmaking, along with jurisdictional doctrines emanating from
Article III—like standing, ripeness, and mootness—would define the
proper range of judicial authority, and, within that range, federal
judges could legitimately make constitutional determinations.244
The legal process school had a profound impact on the field of
federal courts. Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler—following in the
footsteps of their hero Felix Frankfurter—were among the leading
legal process thinkers,245 and the Hart and Wechsler casebook was
both heavily influenced by, and contributed to the influence of, this
school of thought.246 Indeed, the legal process framework was
“accepted for nearly forty years by scholars and judges as a starting
point of analysis of federal courts issues.”247
A “political question doctrine” that would define and limit the
scope of judicial review fit nicely with the legal process image of a
judicial function confined by procedure. The legal process movement
thus helps explain why academics in the early to mid-twentieth century increasingly emphasized Pacific States and the plurality decisions
in Coleman and Colegrove.248
MINDA, supra note 236, at 35, 37 (stating that legal process theorists “accepted the realists’
claim that judges engage in policy-making when they decide legal cases”).
243 See KALMAN, supra note 237, at 30–31, 41–42 (observing that “[p]rocess theorists
were . . . obsessed with procedural issues [and] with limiting the role of the federal courts,”
particularly in the exercise of judicial review); MINDA, supra note 236, at 34–35 (tracing
legal process theory back to Hart and Sacks’s belief that “respect for procedure and
principled decision making might lead judges to outcomes that conform to institutional and
democratic norms”).
244 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 236, 238 (1995)
(noting that, for legal process theorists, “[p]ost-realist jurisprudence must depart from the
truism that judges make law and begin instead with the question of how they make law”
and that process theorists emphasized the importance of “reasoned elaboration”); MINDA,
supra note 236, at 35, 37 (noting that legal process theorists hoped self-restraint and
reasoned decisionmaking would constrain discretion); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112
YALE L.J. 153, 241–44 (2002) (discussing how legal process theorists advocated reasoned
decisionmaking as a way to constrain the judiciary); infra notes 256–58 and accompanying
text (noting Alexander Bickel’s reliance on jurisdictional doctrines to limit judicial review).
245 See Friedman, supra note 244, at 229–31 (describing Felix Frankfurter and Learned
Hand as “heroes of the Legal Process school” whose teachings were extremely influential).
246 See Amar, supra note 18, at 690–91 (noting that the Hart and Wechsler casebook
helped to “defin[e] what has come to be one of the most important schools of legal thought
in late twentieth-century America, typically described as ‘the legal process school’”);
Wells, supra note 240, at 623–24 (“The Legal Process theory of adjudication serves as an
essential premise for the [casebook’s] conception of federal courts law . . . .”).
247 Wells, supra note 240, at 623–24.
248 Although it is hard to pin down precisely when the legal process school began, Neil
Duxbury has suggested that “process jurisprudence” dates back at least to the 1930s.
DUXBURY, supra note 244, at 234–35.
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Over time, this “doctrine” became such an important part of the
legal discourse that jurists and scholars incorporated it into their theories of judicial review. Thus, both Justice Frankfurter and Judge
Learned Hand (another leading figure in the legal process movement),249 pointed to the doctrine in arguing for judicial restraint.
Writing in 1955, Justice Frankfurter insisted that the political question
doctrine refuted any claim that “courts of justice ‘must of necessity
determine’” every constitutional question that came before them.250
Three years later, Judge Hand likewise urged that, since “the Supreme
Court has steadfastly refused to decide constitutional issues that it
deems to involve ‘political questions’—a term it has never tried to
define,” it was clear that the Court need not invalidate government
action “whenever [it] sees, or thinks that it sees, an invasion of the
Constitution.”251 “It is always a preliminary question how importunately the occasion demands an answer.”252
Responding to Judge Hand, Herbert Wechsler denied that the
Supreme Court had broad discretion to refuse to answer a constitutional question.253 But, notably, Wechsler agreed that the political
question doctrine was an important limit on the Court’s judicial
review power; he simply insisted that such a limit, like the exercise of
judicial review itself, had to be based on “neutral principles.”254 In
Wechsler’s view, “all the [political question] doctrine can defensibly
imply is that the courts are called upon to judge” whether “the
Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another
agency of government than the courts.”255
The political question doctrine was central to the theory of
Supreme Court decisionmaking presented by Alexander Bickel,
another prominent legal process scholar.256 Much like Judge Hand,
249 See supra note 245; see also KALMAN, supra note 237, at 30 (identifying Judge Hand
as a member of the legal process school).
250 Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217,
227 (1955) (stating “[t]here are not a few . . . instances in which judicial relief was barred
because ‘political questions’ were deemed to be involved,” such as Guarantee Clause
cases).
251 HAND, supra note 215, at 15–16.
252 Id.
253 Wechsler, supra note 214, at 5–6.
254 See id. at 7–8, 15–16 (“[T]he judicial process . . . must be genuinely principled, resting
. . . on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result . . . .”).
255 Id. at 7–9. Notably, Wechsler identified various constitutional issues that might
involve such a “commitment.” See id. at 8–9 (listing impeachment, the seating or expulsion
of a senator or representative, the Guarantee Clause, and state gerrymanders).
256 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 63–64, 69–71,
183–98 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing various applications of the political question doctrine in
connection with Bickel’s theory of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process);
KALMAN, supra note 237, at 30 (identifying Bickel as a “process theorist”).
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Bickel believed that the doctrine gave the Court broad (albeit not
unfettered) discretion to abstain from decision in constitutional
cases.257 But Bickel did not advocate judicial restraint in all contexts.
On the contrary, he urged the Court to use the political question doctrine and other jurisdictional devices to “stay[ ] its hand” in some
cases, so that it could play its full role in other cases, like Brown v.
Board of Education, without enduring too much political backlash.258
Although legal process theorists did not agree on precisely how
the Supreme Court should use the “political question doctrine,” they
consistently characterized the doctrine as an important procedural
limit on the Court’s judicial review power. In this environment, the
traditional political question doctrine may have simply gotten lost—as
it was overlooked (or mischaracterized) by casebook after casebook
and article after article. But there is a deeper reason that the traditional doctrine may have lost favor among academics in the early to
mid-twentieth century. Legal process theorists were supporters of
judicial restraint, but not judicial subservience. Indeed, these scholars
advocated judicial restraint in specific cases in order to safeguard the
federal judicial power in the long run. A doctrine that—like the traditional doctrine—required courts to treat as conclusive the political
branches’ determinations on certain issues, whether those determinations were “right or wrong,”259 would not likely have found favor with
this group.260 The influence of legal process theory thus helps explain
257 Bickel strongly disagreed with Wechsler that the political question doctrine could
amount to simple constitutional interpretation. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court,
1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961). But Bickel
claimed “[t]he antithesis of principle . . . is not whim, nor even expediency, but prudence.”
Id. at 51; see also id. at 75 (suggesting factors for applying the political question doctrine).
258 See BICKEL, supra note 256, at 70–71 (“[A]ll the techniques . . . for staying the
Court’s hand . . . allow leeway to expediency without abandoning principle . . . . There can
be no understanding of the Court without an appreciation of the variety and significance of
these techniques, most of which are lumped roughly and often disingenuously together
under the rubric of jurisdiction.”); see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(holding that the “separate but equal” approach to public education violates the
Fourteenth Amendment).
259 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
260 Moreover, under the traditional doctrine, federal and state courts treated as
conclusive (what were then known as) factual determinations made by the political
branches. But, in the early twentieth century, legal realists began to call into question the
distinction between “law” and “fact.” See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in
Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921) (arguing that there is no
“clear, easily drawn and scientific distinction between so-called ‘statements of evidentiary
facts,’ ‘statements of fact,’ and ‘conclusions of law’”); see also Michael Steven Green, Legal
Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2005) (noting that Walter
Wheeler Cook is “commonly agreed to be” a legal realist). Although legal process scholars
like Henry Hart did not reject the distinction between “law” and “fact,” Professor Hart, in
the legal process materials that he prepared along with Albert Sacks, did point out that
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why commentators were drawn away from the traditional doctrine
and toward a political question doctrine that could confine the scope
of judicial review.
IV
THE MODERN DOCTRINE

AND

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

By 1962, when the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr, much
of the legal community assumed that there was a “political question
doctrine” that could serve as a substantial constraint on the Court’s
constitutional decisionmaking power. Such a “doctrine” was, however,
in serious tension with the Warren Court’s vision of its institutional
role. A few years before Baker, the Court declared in Cooper v.
Aaron that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution,” and that the Court’s constitutional interpretations were “the supreme law of the land” and binding on state and
local actors.261 The Court in Cooper also engaged in some (apparently) revisionist history, for it declared that this principle of judicial
supremacy was first announced in Marbury and had “ever since been
respected . . . as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”262
“law application” did not fit neatly into either category; accordingly, these scholars
suggested that many issues of “law application” ought to be decided by judges, rather than
juries. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 349–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (disagreeing with “critics [who] have concluded that ‘law’
cannot be distinguished analytically from ‘fact’” but asserting that instances of “law
application” do not clearly fall into either category). Notably, as I have mentioned, many
traditional political questions could be described as the application of law to fact (that is, as
mixed questions of law and fact); for example, to determine whether the government of
Buenos Ayres controlled the Falkland Islands (the issue in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance
Co.), the executive likely had to consider questions of international and/or comparative
law. See supra notes 39–51 and accompanying text. Just as legal process scholars were
reluctant to give juries too much power over legal questions, those same scholars may have
also doubted that judges should be bound by the political branches’ determinations of
mixed questions of law and fact (to the extent, of course, that legal process scholars
considered the traditional political question doctrine at all).
261 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
262 Id. A number of commentators have asserted that the Court’s reference to Marbury
as the source of this principle was not accurate. See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical
Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a “Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
375, 408–10 (2003) (“Marshall did not make [that claim] in his Marbury decision.”); Mark
A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and The Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA
L. REV. 609, 627 (2003) (“[Marbury] was not cited as a precedent for the judicial power to
bind all government officials until Cooper v. Aaron in 1957.”); supra notes 147–49 and
accompanying text (noting the debate over whether Marbury proclaimed judicial
supremacy); see also Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal
Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1172–82 (2011) (describing
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The Warren Court’s emphasis on a principle of judicial
supremacy contrasted sharply with the legal process school’s advocacy
of a constrained federal judiciary. Indeed, legal process scholars were
among the most prominent critics of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence.263 The Court’s self-conception also seems in some tension with
the traditional doctrine, which instructed that the judiciary must apply
the political branches’ determinations of certain questions. In this
environment, I argue that the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr created
a new “political question doctrine”—one that would serve, not as a
mechanism of restraint (or subservience), but as a source of judicial
power.
A.

A New Doctrine in Baker v. Carr

Baker involved an equal protection challenge to a Tennessee law
governing state legislative districts.264 As in Colegrove, the plaintiffs in
Baker alleged that the districts were severely malapportioned, such
that the votes of individuals in some districts were accorded less
weight.265
During the deliberations over the case, Justice Frankfurter
argued emphatically that Baker should be dismissed as presenting a
nonjusticiable political question.266 The Justice circulated a sixty-page
memo to his colleagues, insisting that “[t]he present case involves all
of the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause claims
non-justiciable.”267 Justice Frankfurter’s arguments to his colleagues
how the Court’s role as “supreme” vis-à-vis the political branches began to take hold in the
mid-twentieth century).
263 Friedman, supra note 244, at 231–34. Several prominent legal process scholars even
criticized the Court’s most prominent decision—Brown v. Board of Education. See
Wechsler, supra note 214, at 31–34 (criticizing the Brown Court for its failure to
adequately address the freedom of association concerns involved with school segregation);
see also HORWITZ, supra note 234, at 258 (explaining that many process theorists viewed
“Brown . . . as a test of their commitment to judicial restraint”).
264 369 U.S. 186, 187–88, 192–95 (1962).
265 Id. at 192–95.
266 See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION
184–85 (2010) (describing how Justice Frankfurter offered an impassioned ninety-minute
speech at conference, during which he “pull[ed] volumes of the Court’s cases off the
shelves as he darted around the room, gesticulating”); see also KIM ISAAC EISLER, A
JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED
AMERICA 171 (1993) (reporting, similarly, that Justice Frankfurter “spoke for nearly two
hours” after the first oral argument in Baker).
267 Memorandum for the Conference from Justice Felix Frankfurter 28 (Oct. 10, 1961),
in THE PAPERS OF JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS CASES OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/clark/view_doc.php?
page=1&id=A119-05-01 (“The present case involves all of the elements that have made the
Guarantee Clause claims nonjusticiable. It is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim
masqueraded under a different label.”); EISLER, supra note 266, at 171 (reporting that
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embodied the thinking of the legal process movement that he had
inspired. Legal process theorists insisted that there was a political
question doctrine that would limit the scope of judicial review—and
thereby help preserve the legitimacy of the Court.268 In that vein, as
Kim Eisler has observed, Justice Frankfurter advocated dismissal in
Baker, because he feared that a decision on the merits “would constitute such a usurpation of court prerogatives, that it would undermine
the authority of the Court itself.”269
But Justice Frankfurter’s arguments did not ultimately command
the majority of the Supreme Court. Justice Brennan—supported by
three other members of the Court (Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black and Douglas)—insisted from the outset that the Court could
hear the case, giving “little weight to the idea that the Court should
avoid getting involved in ‘political questions.’ ”270 Justice Stewart (the
likely swing vote) was, for his part, also inclined to hear the case but
apparently concerned that precedents like Colegrove might require
dismissal. 271 To secure Justice Stewart’s vote, Justice Brennan endeav-

Justice Frankfurter produced a sixty-page memorandum after the second oral argument in
Baker). Notably, Justice Frankfurter in two sentences of his memo did point toward the
traditional political question doctrine. Frankfurter, supra, at 13 (“Where the question
arises in the course of a litigation involving primarily the adjudication of other issues
between the litigants, the Court accepts as a basis for adjudication the political
departments’ decision of it.”). That may help explain why Justice Brennan’s opinion
acknowledged that strand of the doctrine. See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
268 See supra Part III.C (discussing legal process theory).
269 EISLER, supra note 266, at 174.
270 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 266, at 184–88 (observing that Justice Brennan
believed the Court should resolve Baker and “gave little weight to [Justice Frankfurter’s]
idea that the Court should avoid getting involved in ‘political questions’” and that Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas also advocated a decision on the merits);
see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939–1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 135 (1980) (stating that “[s]ome judges, notably Frankfurter, held
that the apportionment of votes was not fit business for the federal courts” and that “the
Frankfurter view was often cited by authors as being the view of the Court. But the Court
had never so held . . . . When Baker v. Carr . . . triggered a careful analysis of the
apportionment decisions, it became clear that the Court had never endorsed the
Frankfurter view.”).
271 See DOUGLAS, supra note 270, at 135 (“The Conference vote on whether the
question of reapportionment was ‘political’ rather than ‘justiciable’ was five to four. Justice
Stewart was one of the five, though his vote was tentative, dependent on whether thorough
research and a close analysis of the cases would disclose that the question was not
foreclosed by prior decisions.”); see also CLARK, supra note 199, at 174–75 (observing that
Justice Stewart “had firmly established himself as the . . . ‘swing vote’ on many significant
issues” and that, “[a]ccording to Douglas, Stewart wanted to know whether past decisions
had established firmly that apportionment was a political question and hence not
justiciable”).
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ored in the opinion for the Court to survey the entire landscape of the
Court’s “political question” cases.272
I argue that, in providing an “exhaustive and detailed examination of” the Court’s precedents,273 the opinion in Baker did not
merely describe an existing doctrine but articulated a new “political
question doctrine.” One change involved the Court’s treatment of the
traditional doctrine. Although the opinion did not draw a sharp distinction between traditional cases and those involving constitutional
claims,274 Justice Brennan did give more attention to traditional political question cases than many of the scholars in the preceding decades.
Justice Brennan observed, for example, that “the judiciary ordinarily
follows the executive as to which nation has sovereignty over disputed
territory,” and “defer[s] to the political departments in determining
whether Indians are recognized as a tribe.”275
The Baker Court, however, then seemed to significantly modify—
indeed, to signal the demise of—the traditional political question doctrine. First, Justice Brennan’s opinion indicated that the judiciary was
not obligated to enforce the political branches’ determinations,
whether they “be right or wrong.”276 The Court would not “shut its
272 This background helps explain the detail in the Court’s opinion. See DOUGLAS, supra
note 270, at 136 (“Chief Justice Warren assigned the opinion to Justice Brennan on the
theory that if anyone could convince Stewart, Brennan was the one. Brennan worked long
and hard on the opinion, its length being due to the exhaustive and detailed examination of
precedents which he undertook.”); EISLER, supra note 266, at 172 (observing that Justice
Stewart would support only a narrow opinion). In the end, Justice Brennan did not need
Justice Stewart’s vote; Justice Tom Clark opted to vote with the majority and was willing to
support a broad opinion for the plaintiffs. See DOUGLAS, supra note 270, at 136 (“Without
talking to anyone, [Tom Clark] had changed his mind and written a short concurrence,
which, if it had happened earlier, would have made Brennan’s long, scholarly but tedious
opinion unnecessary.”); STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 266, at 188–89 (noting that Clark
withdrew from Frankfurter’s dissent and that “Clark was inclined to go much further than
Stewart; he was willing to announce a remedy rather than merely hold that the district
court had jurisdiction over the case” but that Brennan nevertheless decided to stick with
the narrower result, “preferring to accomplish less rather than risk alienating Stewart”).
273 Cf. DOUGLAS, supra note 270, at 136 (“Brennan worked long and hard on the
opinion, its length being due to the exhaustive and detailed examination of precedents
which he undertook.”).
274 Much like the scholars in the decades leading up to Baker, Justice Brennan’s opinion
treated “foreign relations” and “status of Indian tribes” cases as largely indistinguishable
from “validity of enactments” cases like Coleman. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–13,
214–17 (1962) (finding that, although cases in all three categories are often assumed to be
nonjusticiable political questions, courts will exercise judgment on certain types of cases in
all three categories).
275 Id. at 212–13, 215.
276 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839); see Baker, 369 U.S. at
216–17 (emphasizing that Congress may not “‘arbitrarily call [a group] an Indian tribe.’
Able to discern what is ‘distinctly Indian,’ the courts will strike down any heedless
extension of that label” (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913)); id. at
213 (asserting that “though it is the executive that determines a person’s status as
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eyes to an obvious mistake” in the political branches’ decisionmaking.277 Instead, the judiciary could independently decide both the
factual and the legal issues arising in a case or controversy—giving
deference to the political branches when it chose to do so. According
to Baker, the judiciary would “not stand impotent before an obvious
instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power.”278
Second, Justice Brennan defined the “political question doctrine”
as one that demanded a “dismissal for non-justiciability.”279 As we
have seen, under the traditional doctrine, courts did not dismiss as
nonjusticiable an issue that presented a political question but rather
enforced and applied the political branches’ determinations. After
Baker, there seemed to be little room for such a doctrine.280
The Baker Court also took control over (what existed of) the constitutional side of the political question doctrine. In crafting its six-part
test for the doctrine, the Court indicated that the judiciary would
decline to decide questions only when there was “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it,” or strong prudential grounds for declining
review.281 But the Court also underscored that it would be in charge
of determining whether a matter was “committed” to another branch:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation,
representative of a foreign government, the executive’s statements will be construed where
necessary to determine the court’s jurisdiction”).
277 Baker, 369 U.S. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted).
278 Id. at 217. Notably, in a few traditional cases in the early twentieth century, the
Court had suggested that it might not enforce the decisions of the political branches, if they
were arbitrary. See supra note 161 (discussing Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28). The Court in Baker
more firmly declared that it would not enforce determinations that it found to be incorrect.
279 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (stating that “a political question’s presence” would lead
to a dismissal).
280 This analysis of Baker helps explain why the traditional political question doctrine is
unfamiliar to most jurists and scholars today. But some modern practices do bear a
resemblance to the traditional doctrine, such as the judiciary’s deference to the executive
on factual issues in national security cases. For an important discussion of this tendency,
see Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009).
281 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (listing, as prudential factors, “the impossibility of deciding
[the question] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question”).
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and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution.282

The Court thus declared that, as the “ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution,” it had the “power to decide” which institution may
decide any constitutional question. With control over that first-order
question, the Court could conclude not only that a constitutional issue
was committed to a political branch but also that an issue was committed to the Court itself. Applying this new principle, the Baker
Court held that it had the power to decide the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge.283
In subsequent cases, the Court used its “power to decide who
decides” to proclaim its supremacy over other areas of constitutional
law.284 Powell v. McCormack involved the House of Representatives’
refusal to seat Adam Clayton Powell, a New York representative, due
to his alleged misuse of public funds.285 Article I provides that “[e]ach
house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its own members.”286 Some scholars, including Herbert Wechsler, had
argued before the Powell case that this provision was an “explicit”
textual commitment to Congress to determine whether to seat a
member.287 Likewise, in the Supreme Court, counsel for the House
contended that the Constitution “foreclose[d] any judicial inquiry into
282

Id. at 211.
See id. at 209, 226 (finding the case justiciable, in part, because there was “no
question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this
Court”). The Court dealt with Colegrove—which, of course, also involved an equal
protection challenge to malapportionment—by observing that four of the seven Justices in
that case found the constitutional issue to be justiciable. Id. at 232–37.
Some readers may assert that the Court in Baker could have more readily enhanced
the Court’s power by simply doing away with any notion that constitutional questions may
be political questions. I strongly doubt, however, that such an approach could have
commanded a majority of the Court. By 1962, there was such a strong sense within the
legal community that there was a “political question doctrine” that applied to
constitutional claims—a sense fueled not only by legal process scholars but also by
influential jurists like Justice Frankfurter and Judge Learned Hand—that an opinion
rejecting the concept entirely would not likely have garnered five votes. Instead, Baker did
the next best thing—subtly transforming any such “political question doctrine” into a
vehicle for asserting the Court’s role as the ultimate interpreter of the federal Constitution.
284 See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–30 (2012)
(concluding that the Court had the power to decide a constitutional issue arising in a
foreign affairs case involving passports); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385,
389–400 (1990) (same for the Origination Clause); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–42
(1983) (same for the Naturalization Clause); infra notes 285–89 and accompanying text.
285 395 U.S. 486, 489–93 (1969).
286 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
287 Wechsler, supra note 214, at 8–9 & n.23; see also Scharpf, supra note 106, at 539–40
(asserting that it may be “reasonable to construe” the provision as an “explicit exception to
the general grant of judicial power to the courts in Article III”).
283
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the decision of the House to exclude Mr. Powell.”288 Counsel further
argued, “The decisions [the House] makes pursuant to its exclusive
power under article I, whether right or wrong, must command the
same respect from the other branches as do the decisions of this Court
acting within the scope of its powers under article III.”289
The Supreme Court, however, held that it had the power to
decide the case on the merits and declared that “the House was
without power to exclude [Powell] from its membership.” 290 In discussing the House’s political question argument, the Court emphasized, “[A]s we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, ‘[d]eciding whether a
matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to
another branch . . . is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.’ ”291 The Court held that there was no such
“commitment” in this case.292 Nor were any “other formulations of a
political question ‘inextricable from the case at bar.’ ”293 Again
invoking Baker, the Court underscored that “it is the responsibility of
this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”294
United States v. Nixon involved a Special Prosecutor’s attempt to
subpoena White House tape recordings from President Richard
Nixon.295 The President challenged the subpoena on grounds of executive privilege.296 The Supreme Court rejected the President’s conten288

Brief for Respondents at 19, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (No. 138).
Id. (“[T]he propriety of what the House did in this case was for the House, and the
House alone, to decide.”).
290 Powell, 395 U.S. at 521–22, 547–50. The Court held that the House had the power
only to determine whether an elected member met the age and residency requirements
listed in the Constitution. Id. at 522, 550; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring that
representatives be twenty-five years old, “seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and
. . . when elected . . . an Inhabitant of [the represented] State”).
291 Powell, 395 U.S. at 521 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)); see also id. (“[W]hether there is a ‘textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department’
of government and what is the scope of such commitment are questions we must
resolve . . . .”).
292 See id. at 518–22, 548 (concluding that there is, at most, a limited commitment to
Congress to judge only the qualifications of elected members, as set forth in the
Constitution).
293 Id. at 549 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
294 Id. (“[A] judicial resolution of petitioners’ claim will not result in ‘multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.’ For, as we noted in Baker v.
Carr, . . . it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution.”).
295 See 418 U.S. 683, 686–88 (1974) (reviewing the denial of a motion to quash a thirdparty subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States District Court, District of
Columbia, directing the President to produce certain tape recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aides and advisors).
296 See id. at 686–90, 692–93 (arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the
subpoena because it was an intrabranch dispute between subordinate and superior officers
289
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tion that “the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review
of a President’s claim of [executive] privilege.”297 Although the Court
would accord “great respect” to the President’s view that “the
Constitution [provides] an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all
Presidential communications,” it was “emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”298 Invoking
Baker, the Court underscored that “ ‘[d]eciding whether a matter has
in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch
. . . is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution,’”299 and “reaffirm[ed] that it is the province and duty of
this Court ‘to say what the law is’ with respect to the claim of privilege
presented in this case.”300
In fact, in the fifty-three years since Baker v. Carr, the Supreme
Court has on only two occasions exercised its “power to decide” to
hold that another branch had final authority over a constitutional
question.301 Most recently, in Nixon v. United States, the Court
announced that the Senate had “sole” power to determine the procedures used in an impeachment trial.302 Notably, even in Nixon v.
of the Executive Branch); see also Brief for the Respondent-Cross-Petitioner at 16–17,
44–48, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834) (arguing that
the case raised nonjusticiable political questions).
297 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703. For a discussion of the argument and
holding, see id. at 692–97, 703–05, 713.
298 Id. at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Many decisions of this Court,
however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury . . . that ‘[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’”
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). The Court in United
States v. Nixon, as it had in Cooper, treated Marbury as a case proclaiming judicial
supremacy. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
299 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962)).
300 Id. at 705 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
301 The first instance was Gilligan v. Morgan, where the Court declined to rule on
allegations that the Ohio National Guard violated the free speech and due process rights of
student Vietnam War protesters by using violence to stop a demonstration. See 413 U.S. 1,
3–4 (1973) (recounting the events at Kent State University). Notably, part of the Court’s
opinion suggests that the Court believed the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek prospective
relief. Id. at 5–6, 9–10. But the Court also stated that Congress’s power under Article I,
Section 8 “to prescribe and regulate the training and weaponry of the National Guard . . .
clearly precludes any form of judicial regulation of the same matters.” Id. at 68; see also id.
at 6–12. The Court, however, then qualified this “political question” analysis, declaring that
“we neither hold nor imply that the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond
judicial review.” Id. at 11. Only a plurality of the Court in Goldwater v. Carter found that
the President’s unilateral abrogation of a treaty presented a nonjusticiable political
question. 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979).
302 See 506 U.S. 224, 226–31, 237–38 (1993) (explaining that the plaintiff challenged a
Senate rule, which allowed a Senate committee to gather evidence in impeachment cases);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-6\NYU602.txt

unknown

Seq: 60

2-DEC-15

11:58

December 2015] LOST HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 1967

United States, the Court underscored its role as the supreme expositor
of constitutional law with respect to the other branches of the federal
government. First, invoking Baker and Powell, the Court reiterated its
power to decide “whether and to what extent” another branch could
engage in constitutional interpretation. 303 Second, again relying on
Baker, the Court declared: “As we have made clear, ‘whether the
action of [either the Legislative or Executive Branch] exceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.’ ”304
The language in the Court’s political question cases is not the language of deference or modesty. In fact, Powell v. McCormack and
United States v. Nixon contain some of the first examples of a phenomenon that scholars began to comment on much later—the Court’s
tendency to proclaim itself as the “ultimate interpreter” of constitutional law, whose constitutional views are binding not only on state
and local governments but also on the other branches of the federal
government.305 Accordingly, contrary to the assumption of scholars,
the modern political question doctrine can not only “coexist with” but
is a reflection of the current Court’s conception of itself as “the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”306
B. Comparing the Traditional and the Modern Doctrines
The modern political question doctrine bears little resemblance
to the traditional version. Under the traditional doctrine, both federal
and state courts treated as conclusive the decisions of the political
branches on certain factual issues, whether those decisions were “right
or wrong.”307 Accordingly, the traditional doctrine was truly a doc303 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. at 228 (“[C]ourts must, in the first instance,
interpret the text in question and determine whether and to what extent the issue is
textually committed.” (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 519 (1969))).
304 Id. at 238 (brackets in original) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
305 For a sample of the academic debate over judicial supremacy, see supra notes 24, 27;
infra notes 325–26 (collecting sources); see also Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a
Structural Imperative (or “Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 379–80
(2003) (noting that challenges to judicial supremacy began in earnest in the early 1990s).
Much of the recent scholarship has responded to declarations of judicial supremacy in
decisions interpreting Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (“[E]ver since Marbury
this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or
controversy remains in the Judiciary.”).
306 Barkow, supra note 3, at 313 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7); see also id.
240–41, 300.
307 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
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trine of judicial restraint—indeed, judicial subservience; the judiciary
not only refrained from deciding the issue but also served as an
enforcement mechanism for the political branches. After Baker v.
Carr, there was little, if anything, left of this doctrine of judicial subservience.308 In its place, the Supreme Court crafted a doctrine of judicial power, which permits Article III federal courts—and, ultimately,
the Supreme Court itself—to decide who decides a constitutional
question.
Some readers may argue, however, that the traditional and
modern doctrines are not necessarily as distinct as I suggest. One
could contend that, under both doctrines, the Supreme Court must
make a choice to designate an issue (factual or constitutional) as a
“political” or “judicial” question. Thus, even under the traditional
doctrine, the judiciary was ultimately in control; it was “subservient”
to the political branches only if it chose to call a factual issue a “political question.”
But this argument overlooks the very different jurisprudential
assumptions underlying the traditional doctrine. First, it does not
appear that the nineteenth-century judiciary that developed the traditional doctrine viewed itself as having much discretion in designating
certain issues as political questions. Before the legal realist movement
of the early twentieth century, there seems to have been a greater
sense that judges did not “make” law but “found” legal principles that
applied to a given case.309 Along these lines, in cases like Williams v.
Suffolk Insurance Co., there is little indication that the judges viewed
themselves as making a “choice” to designate a given question as a
political question; instead, both federal and state judges seemed to
assume that some issues simply qualified as political questions, such
that judges were bound to apply the political branches’ determinations
of those questions.310
308

For one possible modern-day analogue, see supra note 280.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860,
at 255–57 (1977) (noting the decidedly “formalistic cast” of public law during this period);
supra note 236 and accompanying text.
310 See supra Part I.A. I do not mean to suggest that nineteenth-century judges were
simply “finding” political questions, without any justification. As noted above, it seems
likely that the judges relied (at least implicitly) on the assumption that the political
branches had superior constitutional authority over, and greater expertise with respect to,
certain issues, such as foreign affairs and relations with Native American tribes. See supra
note 82 and accompanying text. But in my review of the cases, I saw little indication that
the judges of this era understood themselves as having broad discretion to designate
certain issues as political questions. See also supra note 29 (discussing my methodology in
identifying the early cases). Indeed, there was very little discussion in the opinions about
why some issues, rather than others, qualified as political questions.
309
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Second, in contrast to the modern doctrine, the traditional doctrine was not a constitutional matter arising out of Article III. Instead,
it appears to have been a common law rule governing the power of the
federal and state judiciaries—a rule that was subject to legislative
override. Thus, when courts found that an issue was a “political question,” they treated it as such only as a default matter; courts and commentators in the nineteenth century assumed that Congress could
transform a “political question” into a “judicial question” by asking
courts to decide the issue.311 Accordingly, it seems that Congress, not
the judiciary, was ultimately in charge of deciding the scope of the
traditional doctrine.
The modern political question doctrine, by contrast, was created
in the postrealist era, when we more clearly understand judges to have
a choice in crafting legal rules. In this environment, the Court in
Baker made clear which institution would have the power to choose
who decides a constitutional question: “Deciding whether a matter
has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch . . . is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution.”312 And because the Court today describes the political question doctrine as an Article III jurisdictional device (and, thus,
itself a matter of federal constitutional law), Congress cannot override
that judgment, other than through constitutional amendment.313
This understanding of the modern doctrine—as an assertion of
judicial power rather than a form of judicial restraint—not only distinguishes the modern from the traditional doctrine but also calls into
question a common scholarly assumption about the modern doctrine.
Scholars often presume that the political question doctrine has no
impact, unless the Supreme Court declines to review a constitutional
claim. Under this view, the Court does not “invoke” the doctrine
when it decides a case on the merits, as it did in Powell v.
McCormack.314 Building on this assumption, Louis Henkin ques311

See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also supra notes 23, 283 (offering an exposition of the
same quote).
313 Notably, it is not clear that the current doctrine should be an Article III jurisdictional
device. If the federal Constitution does “commit” certain issues to the political branches,
then it would seem that neither federal nor state courts could adjudicate those federal
constitutional questions. This particular puzzle about the modern doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Article. For scholarship suggesting that state courts do in practice dismiss
certain claims as nonjusticiable political questions (at least as a matter of state
constitutional law), see Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Political Question Doctrine in State
Constitutional Law, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 573, 579 (2013); Nat Stern, The Political Question
Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 406–07 (1984).
314 E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2308 & n.1150
312
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tioned whether there is a political question doctrine at all—given how
rarely the Court declines review.315 But I argue that the modern political question doctrine serves an important function not only when the
Court denies review but also when it (far more commonly) declares
that it has the “power to decide” constitutional questions. The Court
uses the modern political question doctrine as a vehicle for asserting
its supremacy over constitutional law.
C.

Assessing the Modern Doctrine

The Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr and subsequent cases proclaimed for itself the power to decide who decides a constitutional
question. Admittedly, that is only an assertion of power. The Court
cannot unilaterally make itself “supreme”; its assertions of supremacy
will ultimately have a practical impact only if other members of
society, particularly political actors, acquiesce. But as political scientists have urged, Congress and the executive branch have good reason
to acquiesce in the Court’s declarations of “supremacy.” If political
actors treat the Supreme Court as generally “in charge” of constitutional questions, they can, for example, more easily refer controversial
issues to the judiciary,316 or advance a particular political agenda
through the judiciary.317 Political actors are thus likely to take seriously the Court’s declarations of supremacy in its modern political
question cases. For this reason, it is important to ask whether such
claims have any normative justification.
(2002) (asserting that “[a] Court majority has invoked the political question doctrine in
only two cases since Baker”). This assumption is why so many scholars assert that the
political question doctrine is on the decline. See supra note 6–9 and accompanying text.
315 See Henkin, supra note 3, at 609–10, 622–23 (assuming the “political question
doctrine” consists only of cases, like Guarantee Clause cases, where the Court declines
review).
316 See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993) (asserting that “prominent elected officials
consciously invite the judiciary to resolve” contentious issues); Keith E. Whittington,
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by
the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 584 (2005) (“The
establishment and maintenance of judicial review is a way of delegating some kinds of
political decisions to a relatively politically insulated institution.”).
317 See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511,
512–13, 516–17 (2002) (discussing the Republican Party’s efforts to use the judiciary to
advance a probusiness agenda); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial
Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional
Revolutions, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 116 (2000) (arguing that political leaders will
empower the judiciary if they believe its decisions will “reflect their ideological
preferences”).
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One of the primary goals of this Article is to show that, at a minimum, the Court’s assertion of the power to decide who decides a constitutional question cannot be justified on historical grounds. There
was no “political question doctrine” that applied generally to constitutional claims until Baker. And even the scholars (primarily of the legal
process school) who advocated a political question doctrine governing
constitutional claims in the early to mid-twentieth century envisioned
a doctrine that would constrain the judiciary, not one that would
empower it.
This lack of historical pedigree has important implications for
ongoing debates over the political question doctrine.318 In federal
courts scholarship and jurisprudence, there is a widespread assumption that Article III jurisdictional rules are legitimate only if they have
a long “history and tradition.”319 This Article demonstrates that the
modern political question doctrine cannot be defended on that basis.
Accordingly, those who seek to preserve or expand the political question doctrine must find an alternative ground to support it.
The analysis here should also impact future debates about
whether the doctrine can be justified on nonhistorical grounds.
Although scholars have long assumed that the political question doctrine is at odds with judicial supremacy, I demonstrate that the
modern doctrine is part and parcel of the Court’s assertions of
supremacy. Accordingly, nonhistorical arguments in favor of the doctrine should naturally build on existing arguments for judicial
supremacy.
One can envision such a defense of the modern political question
doctrine. Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer, for example, have advocated judicial supremacy on the ground that the Supreme Court can
serve an important settlement function.320 If the Court is the supreme
318

For a sample of that debate, see sources cited supra notes 3, 24.
See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008) (noting the
Court’s reliance on “history and tradition” in determining “the types of cases that Article
III empowers federal courts to consider”). For example, in debates over Article III
standing doctrine, many jurists and scholars assume that the legitimacy of the doctrine
depends on whether it has a long historical pedigree. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, What’s
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries,’ and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
168, 178 (1992) (arguing that the notion that Article III limits Congress’s power to confer
standing “seems most adventurous as a matter of history”), with Ann Woolhandler &
Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691,
694–724 (2004) (contending that “constitutionalization [of standing] does not contradict a
settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning”); see also Vt. Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (upholding the
standing of qui tam relators in part because of “the long tradition of qui tam actions in
England and the American Colonies”).
320 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 27, at 1385.
319
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expositor of specific constitutional questions, then (for example) when
the Court decides that Congress has the power to enact a health care
law,321 or lacks the power to extend voting rights legislation,322 that
issue is “settled” and political actors can carry on with other legislative
proposals, with the common understanding that all other actors will
treat as binding the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.323
By the same reasoning, one could argue that constitutional law
will be much more predictable and coherent if the Supreme Court can
designate a single institution to be in charge of “settling” the meaning
of specific constitutional provision(s). Thus, the Court can declare
itself to be in charge of most areas of constitutional law, while delegating control over specific realms, such as the Guarantee Clause and
the Impeachment Clause, to another institution. As long as there is a
single final decisionmaker for each provision of the Constitution, constitutional law will be largely settled. Moreover, with control over the
first-order question of “who decides,” the Court can also take back
any such delegation of interpretive authority. The Court has, for
example, suggested that it may revisit its prior decisions on the
Guarantee Clause and once again assert the power to decide constitutional questions arising under that provision.324
For those who oppose “interpretive supremacy,” however, the
power claimed by the Supreme Court under the modern political

321 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012) (upholding
the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act as a proper exercise of the
taxing power).
322 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating the extension
of a Voting Rights Act provision requiring certain states to preclear their voting changes
with the Department of Justice or a federal court due to an outdated coverage formula).
323 Various scholars have emphasized the coordinating function of judicial decisions.
See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 108 (2009) (asserting that “[i]f the constitution is vague . . .
[c]onstitutional review provides focal points for enforcement”).
324 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184–86 (1992) (raising the question
whether Guarantee Clause claims should be justiciable and declaring that the Court “need
not resolve that difficult question,” because “[e]ven if we assume that [the] claim [here] is
justiciable,” it failed on the merits); see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A
DIALOGUE 68 n.46 (1995) (noting the Court’s assumption that some Guarantee Clause
claims may be justiciable). A case from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals may eventually
give the Court an opportunity to revisit its Guarantee Clause rulings. See Kerr v.
Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1161–62, 1172–81 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that state
legislators’ Guarantee Clause challenge to a Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, which required
voter approval for tax laws, did not present a nonjusticiable political question), vacated and
remanded by Hickenlooper v. Kerr, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.) (directing the lower
court to reconsider the decision in light of Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015)).
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question doctrine should be deeply troubling.325 Many scholars today
advocate “departmentalism”—the notion that each branch of government should independently interpret the Constitution in performing
its functions and need not be bound by the views of the Supreme
Court (at least not outside the context of a specific case or controversy). 326 Under the modern political question doctrine, the Supreme
Court declares that there is no such background principle of interpretive independence. Instead, the Court decides who decides any constitutional question. Thus, under the modern doctrine, the political
branches have a role in defining constitutional meaning only to the
extent permitted by the Supreme Court.
I do not seek here to resolve whether the modern political question doctrine can be justified on nonhistorical grounds; the answer to
that question is bound up in the ongoing debate over judicial
supremacy and departmentalism. But I do aim to challenge the
common assumption that the political question doctrine may serve as
a refuge for those who believe that the Supreme Court should not
have the final word on all constitutional issues.327 The modern political question doctrine is a species of—not a limitation on—judicial
supremacy.
CONCLUSION
The political question doctrine that we study today does not have
a long historical pedigree. In the nineteenth century, “political questions” were not constitutional questions but instead were factual
determinations made by the political branches that courts treated as
conclusive in the course of deciding cases. Moreover, this traditional
political question doctrine did not arise under Article III. Both federal
and state courts, in both civil and criminal cases, were required to
325 E.g., Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA.
L. REV. 83, 85 (1998) (doubting that the Supreme Court should have “the last word on the
Constitution’s meaning”); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and
Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J.
373, 373–74 (1994) (rejecting judicial supremacy); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against
Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (2005).
326 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 27, at 1270, 1279, 1303; see also David Barron,
Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 63 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003) (arguing that Congress may under the
Fourteenth Amendment enact laws “premised on an understanding of the Constitution
that differs from the Court’s”); supra notes 27, 325.
327 See supra note 24 (noting that scholarly opponents of judicial supremacy tend to
favor the political question doctrine).
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enforce and apply the political branches’ determinations on “political
questions.”
The current political question doctrine was not created until the
mid-twentieth century, when it was used by the Supreme Court to
secure its growing supremacy over constitutional law. Under the
modern doctrine, the Court asserts for itself the power to decide
which institution decides any constitutional question. With control
over that first-order question, the Court can conclude not only that an
issue is textually committed to a political branch but also that an issue
is committed to the Court itself. Indeed, that is how the Court has
most often used its modern political question cases—as a vehicle to
assert its supremacy over various areas of constitutional law. For this
reason, the modern doctrine is a reflection of—not a limitation on—
the current Court’s view of itself as the ultimate expositor of constitutional law.

